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ABSTRACT 
The United States military strategy for the Philippine Archi- 
pelago from 1924 to 1941 was to fight defensively and retain Manila 
Bay until the islands could be resupplied and reinforced from the 
mainland. Although in 1940, an increase of army and navy aviation 
strength in the Philippines was recommended to provide a more cred- 
ible U.S. deterrent to further Japanese expansion, the proposal was 
rejected. Thus, until July 1941, the U.S. policy was a defensive 
one; however, in the late summer of that year, the U.S. Government 
acted decisively and determined to send heavy bombers to the Philip- 
pine Islands. That decision was made shortly after the freezing of 
Japanese assets on July 26, and it proved beyond a doubt that the 
United States earnestly intended to protect her national interests 
in the Pacific. 
On July 31, 1941, the dramatic reversal of policy occurred. 
General Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, recorded in his 
diary, "At a conference attended by General Bryden, General Haislip, 
General Twaddle and myself, the Chief of Staff stated that it was 
the policy of the United States to defend the Philippines." General 
Marshall partially based his Philippine reinforcement decision on 
General Arnold's recommendations. Arnold proposed placing a total 
of 340 heavy bombers and 260 pursuit planes in the Far East. Those 
recommendations were largely based on forthcoming production. 
President Roosevelt tried to provide Great Britain with all 
possible military aid and develop credible armed forces for U.S. 
-1- 
defense.  The President swung; from wholehearted support for the Far 
Eastern build-up to partial support.  In October 19m, Roosevelt 
wanted to divert to the British additional Flying Fortresses that 
had been assigned to General Douglas MacArthur (Commanding General 
United States Forces Far East).  Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold ef- 
fectively dissuaded F.D.R. from diverting the heavy bombers to 
Great Britain. 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Chief of Staff George Mar- 
shall, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Henry Arnold were the 
major advocates of the B-17 build-up in the Philippine Islands. 
All three believed that United States diplomacy and security in the 
Far East had to be supported by military power. 
The U.S. never completed its reinforcement of the Philippine 
Islands but the build-up displayed boldness and imagination.  In 
1941, Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold took a calculated risk when 
they placed B-17's in the Far East.  Although their gamble failed, 
the repercussions were minimal on the overall strategic position of 
the United States. 
-2- 
CHAPTER I 
"Establishing the Strategy" 
The United States military strategy for the Philippine Archi- 
pelago from 1924 to 1941 was to fight defensively and retain Manila 
Bay until the islands could be resupplied and reinforced from the 
mainland.  Although in 1910, an increase of army and navy aviation 
strength in the Philippines was recommended to provide a more cred- 
ible U.S. deterrent to further Japanese expansion, the proposal was 
rejected. The rejection was not of a military nature; rather the 
2 
American armament industry was nascent at best.  Thus, until July 
19m, the U.S. policy was a defensive one; however, in the late 
summer of that year, the U.S. Government acted decisively and deter- 
mined to send over heavy bombers to the Philippine Islands. That 
decision was made shortly after the freezing of Japanese assets on 
July 26, and it proved beyond a doubt that the United States earn- 
estly intended to protect her national interests in the Pacific. 
Since the British situation in the autumn of 1940 had been 
critical, the United States had to act alone against Japanese expan- 
sion in the Pacific.  In October 1940, President Franklin D. Roose- 
velt revived his plan for a naval quarantine of Japan; however, that 
3 
program was not adopted.  Then, on October 23, 1940, Secretary of 
the Navy Frank Knox wrote the President that he had talked with the 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson concerning the latter's proposal to 
send a force to Singapore. What eventually developed was a modest 
program for reinforcing the Philippines. The program "... in- 
volved a revision of the long accepted view that in the event of war 
-3- 
those islands could not be held.. . ."  Two squadrons of pursuit 
planes and ten additional submarines were sent that October, but 
these did not constitute any substantive revision of the outlook that 
in the event of war the Philippines could not be maintained. 
In November Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, put for- 
ward Plan D or Dog as the recommended strategic posture of the United 
States. According to this plan, the primary theatre of operations 
would be the Atlantic because Germany represented the greatest threat 
to our national survival.  Later, Plan Dog was wholly incorporated 
into Rainbow 5. 
In the beginning of 1941 ". . . it appeared that Britain would 
survive and the newly revised Rainbow 5 was the most likely contin- 
gency for which to plan.. . ."  A Presidential directive of Janu- 
ary 17, 1941, stated that if the United States was attacked by a 
"... sudden and simultaneous action on the part of Germany and 
Japan ... we would stand on the defensive in the Pacific. . ." 
Though there was no specific crisis with Japan, in mid- 
January 1941, Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, at a plan- 
ning meeting attended by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, directed 
"... that the Navy should have under consideration the possibility 
g 
of bombing attacks against Japanese cities."  However, the Joint 
Planning Committee, which was comprised of representatives from the 
Army and the Navy, recommended that only $52 million "... author- 
ized but not appropriated by Congress, be made to the Commonwealth 
Government to reinforce its ordinary budget in furthering the Ameri- 
can defense plans in the Philippines." The money could be used for 
-4- 
various defensive needs and such special projects as ". . . air 
fields, gas-proofing, bombing-proofing, protected storage and com- 
munications.. . ." 
President Manuel Quezon of the Philippines believed and, both 
the Joint Planning Committee and the Joint Board concurred, that 
this assistance could greatly lift the morale of the Philippine na- 
tion and its armed forces. Any material which the Philippine Islands 
needed, however, would be sent only after British and United States 
forces were "... raised and trained.. . ." This effectively meant 
that the Islands would receive very little.  The Philippine Govern- 
ment was permitted to place orders for equipment "... the delivery 
date being coordinated with deliveries to other purchasers so as to 
meet the requirements of the United States most effectively."  In 
February, General Marshall wrote the commander of the Philippine De- 
partment, Major General George Grunert: "I have been working on your 
various recommendations and what might be done to help out despite 
our great deficiencies in material at the present time."   Despite 
the Chief of Staff's efforts very little additional material aid was 
sent to the islands. 
The strategic posture of the United States, as represented by 
Plan Dog and Rainbow 5 in March 1941, was essentially incorporated 
by the American, British, and Canadian Staff talks into ABC-1. 
Those January-to-March conversations were extended to the Far East 
at the Singapore Conference, attended by representatives from the 
United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Their report 
dealt with an overall strategy for the Far East. However, the Chief 
-5- 
of Naval Operations Admiral Stark joined General Marshall in reject- 
ing the ADB report "because it was at variance with ABC-1 and did not 
12 
constitute a 'practical operating plan for the Far East Area'." 
Due to the strategic needs of other areas, the United States was 
still unable to provide the Philippines with additional reinforce- 
ments.  Matloff and Snell in their Strategic Planning for Coalition 
Warfare stated that with the situation as it existed in early 1941 it 
was "... not considered possible to hope to launch a strong offen- 
sive from the Philippines." 
That was the strategic position of the United States in the 
Far East in April 1941.  While the military situation seemed des- 
perate, the diplomatic situation in the early part of 1941 appeared 
so hopeless that the American Ambassador to Tokyo, Joseph C. Grew, 
thought that negotiations with the Japanese Government were virtu- 
ally impossible.  He wrote: 
One of my colleagues in Tokyo recently 
characterized the present situation in 
Japan as one of unstable equilibrium. 
. . .  'Equilibrium' between the moder- 
ates and extremists seems hardly the 
right word.  The latter are firmly in 
the saddle, and in practice there is 
ample evidence that they intend to push 
rapidly ahead .... The outlook for the 
future of the United States has never 
been darker. 
Diplomatically and strategically Japan had two potentially 
powerful friends or enemies in the Far East, Russia and the United 
States. The Japanese could either play one against the other, at- 
tempt to strike a middle ground between the two, or ally herself 
with one or the other.  Only the most ardent and most foolish 
-6- 
nationalist believed that Japan could survive the opposition of both 
the United States and Russia in the Far East. With Great Britain 
fighting Germany and Italy in Europe, her (Great Britain's) assist- 
ance to the U.S., the Commonwealth nations or the Netherlands East 
Indies could not be of major impact. 
Russia regained some prestige (after her defeat in the Russo- 
Japanese War 1904-1905) in the summer of 1939 during the Nomaham in- 
cident.  "It took Zhukov's tanks eleven days to roll the twenty miles 
to the [Manchurian] border and 20,000 of the 60,000 Japanese de- 
fenders died in front of them."   Right on the heels of that dis- 
aster, Tokyo was surprised by the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact 
(August 19, 1939).  Thus, Japan was dealt a military defeat and a 
very serious diplomatic setback. Russia was no longer preoccupied 
with her western frontier and the Anti-Comintern Pact among Germany, 
Japan and Italy was virtually a dead letter. Japanese Home Minister 
Kido referring to the Russian-German Pact, "... wrote in his 
diary:  'However we consider the Anti-Comintern Pact and its attached 
secret protocols, we are startled that there has been this breach of 
faith'."   Indeed, "The German-Soviet Pact destroyed the whole basis 
of Japanese policy towards Europe and there was little concealment 
17 
of the dismay and bitterness in Tokyo."   Japan had been "... 
made to look ridiculous in the eyes of the world", but the German 
and Soviet collaboration could have affected ". . .a Soviet-Japanese 
18 
accord, which would ..." have freed Japan to expand southward. 
A Strike North concept eminated within the Japanese Govern- 
ment from a faction that wanted to fight Russia and expand northward. 
-7- 
The Hitler-Stalin Non-Aggression Pact and the Nomahan incident ended 
much of the so-called Strike North f"alk. Another deviating blow to 
the northern expansionists proponents came in June 1940 when France 
fell to the German war machine. The Japanese had been pressuring 
France, with little satisfaction, concerning Indo-China. However, 
the French "... surrender to Germany profoundly altered the situa- 
19 tion and the Japanese were quick to seize their advantage."   By 
the end of June 1940, Germany's European supremacy "... orphaned 
French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, the richest colonies in 
southeast Asia." 
As a result, in July 1940, a liaison conference among Japan's 
ministers of the Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff "called for 
stronger ties with Germany and renewed diplomatic efforts to neutral- 
21 ize Russia."   August, one year after the Hitler-Stalin Non-Ag- 
gression Pact, brought Japan full cycle in her diplomatic relations 
with Germany, and the Imperial Government signed a defensive mili- 
tary alliance with the Third Reich and Italy.  In September at a con- 
ference in the Imperial Presence, the Army Chief of Staff Prince 
Kanin stated: 
On the basis of our studies to date, 
the Army section of the Imperial Head- 
quarters agrees with the government's 
proposal for stronger Axis Pact with 
Germany and Italy. Furthermore, since 
the improvement of relations with the 
Soviet Union is extremely important 
both for the settlement of the China 
incident and for future defense poli- 
cies, we would strongly urge that the 
government redouble its efforts in 
this area. 
-8- 
Even so, it was not until January 1941 that Emperor Hirohito of 
Japan put pressure on Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuki to obtain an 
23 
agreement with Russia.   However, as David Bergamini has written, 
"Matsuoka did not want Japan to sign a pact of neutrality with the 
U.S.S.R. because he hoped secretly that Japan would soon join Ger- 
many in war with the U.S.S.R."   But Matsuoka had to negotiate a 
mutual non-aggression pact with the Russians, no matter what he de- 
sired, because Japan's northern flank had to be secure if she struck 
south. Emperor Hirohito seemed disposed to an attack on Singapore 
though he ". . . was not yet ready for the concomitant war with the 
United States."25 
On April 13, 1911, Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuko Matsuoka 
and Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov concluded the Russo- 
Japanese non-aggression pact. With this agreement, Japan could 
either resolve her China problem or leave it in abeyance while pur- 
suing her Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere southward. The 
Philippine archipelago, French Indo-China, Singapore, and in fact, 
everything south of Japan appeared ominously naked. 
While Matsuoka was busy in March and April with Russian ne- 
gotiations and visits to Germany and Italy, President Roosevelt's 
cabinet discussed the possibility of decreasing or ending Japanese 
imports of American oil.  "State Department estimates in April, 
1911, were that the Japanese would receive from the United States 
and the Dutch East Indies 12 million barrels during that year or 
26 
three times the normal amount." 
As the United States Government pondered its oil policy 
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toward Japan, Congress made assistance to Great Britain a national 
priority.  In March, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act but avail- 
is 
able material, especially airplanes was scant. When the British re- 
quest for heavy bombers was received on March 3, Harry Hopkins 
urged that additional B-17's be given to them.  On March 5, 1941, 
General Arnold recommended to the Chief of Staff George Marshall 
that no further B-17's be given to England.  Then Arnold complained 
"The Air Corps had furnished 20 B-17 airplanes to the British. 
This number will provide for the combat operations of a squadron 
. . ."   President Franklin Roosevelt, as Arnold wrote on March 10, 
1941, "... objected very strenuously to the attitude taken by me 
in connection with aid to Britain . . . ." Roosevelt made his feel- 
ings known through the versatile Harry Hopkins and "Hopkins expres- 
sed himself in no uncertain terms about . . . [my (Arnold's) recom- 
mendations]." 
As the Secretary of War later wrote in August, 1941, "All 
they [the British] want now is a great big 4-engine bomber regard- 
less of the fact that we are behind in those bombers mainly because 
they knocked them so hard in the beginning . . .  With their help in 
building up production, we could have been in a very different situ- 
29 
ation to what we are now . . . ." 
In 1941 F.D.R. faced the realities of modern air warfare, 
and the results of the 1939-1940 bombing were devastating. Because 
of U.S. weakness in heavy bombers and the belief that the outcome of 
the war might hinge on air power, the President and Secretary of War 
initiated the new Big Bomber Program in May, 1941.  Roosevelt wrote 
-10- 
Stimson on May 4 "The effective defense of this country and the 
vital defense of other democratic nations requires that there be 
30 
a substantial increase in heavy bomber production."   Secretary of 
War Stimson responded on May 6 to the President "I have your two 
letters of May 4th.  As was made clear I believe that our big 
bomber program can be brought up to the monthly rate [of 500 a month] 
31 
which you mentioned by the middle of 1943."   In May 1941, no one 
seriously considered substantial reinforcement of the Philippine 
Islands with Flying Fortresses, yet within only a few weeks that be- 
came an integral part of the strategic distribution of B-17's. 
In August the United States began planning the deployment of 
Flying Fortresses in the Far East.  These heavy bombers from the 
Philippine Islands could menace Japan's vital lines of communication 
to the South.  However, the first test of the United States' ability 
to reinforce the Philippines by air was not completed until Friday, 
September 12, 1941.  A detailed report of the Trans-Pacific Flight 
32 
was immediately forwarded to Washington to aid in future flights. 
(See Appendix I). 
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CHAPTER II 
"A New Strategy for the Philippines - July 1941" 
U.S. relations with Japan had deteriorated steadily through- 
out the late spring and early summer of 1941.  Germany's attack on 
Soviet Russia in June, 1941 offered Japan another set of options. 
"The Nipponese government decided to exploit this golden opportu- 
nity by gobbling up the weakly held territories of southeast Asia 
one by one, beginning with southern Indo-China."  In July, the 
Japanese began to implement their new policy. 
The United States responded to this policy by intensifying 
diplomatic and economic pressure on Japan.  On July 23, 1941, 
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles expressed the position of 
the United States to Japanese Ambassador Nomura, most explicitly: 
The movement now undertaken by Japan 
could only be regarded by the United 
States as having two probable purposes, 
neither of which purpose this govern- 
ment could ignore:  First, the United 
States could only assume that the occu- 
pation of Indo-China by Japan constituted 
notice to the United States that the Ja- 
panese Government intended to pursue a 
policy of force and of conquest, and 
second, that in the light of these acts 
on the part of Japan, the United States, 
with regard to its own safety in the 
light of its own preparations for self- 
defense , must assume that the Japanese 
Government was taking the last step be- 
fore proceeding upon a policy of totali- 
tarian expansion in the South Seas 
through the seizure of additional terri- 
tories in that region. * 
Two days later, Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, wrote the 
President:  "Due to the situation in the Far East, all practical 
-12- 
steps should be taken to increase the defensive strength of the 
3 
Philippine Islands." 
Then, on July 26, two significant events occurred.  First, 
by executive order, Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the 
U.S.; although initially designed not to end all trade with Japan, 
that was the practical result after August 1941.  According to 
Langer and Gleason, the joint actions of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Netherlands resulted in an economic block- 
ade of Japan.  Second, President Roosevelt acting on the recommend- 
ations of his military advisers, nationalized the armed forces of 
the Philippine Army and appointed former Chief of Staff Douglas 
MacArthur Commanding General of the United States Army Forces Far 
East (USAFFE).  That appointment was a firm indication to Japan 
of U.S. determination to maintain itself in the Far East.  Still, 
these actions did not alter the basic strategic policy of the U.S. 
towards the Philippines. This is reflected in a cable sent on 
July 28 to General MacArthur.  Two days after he had assumed com- 
mand of USAFFE, MacArthur learned from the Adjutant General's of- 
fice, that "No additional forces except approximately four hundred 
reserve officers . . . will be available for your command in [the] 
5 
near future." 
Then, on July 31, the dramatic reversal of policy occurred. 
General Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, recorded in his 
diary, "At a conference attended by General Bryden, General Hais- 
lip, General Twaddle and myself, the Chief of Staff stated that 
it was the policy of the United States to defend the Philippines." 
-13- 
Gerow noted that, "This defense will not be permitted to jeopard- 
ize the major efforts made in the theater of the Atlantic." 
Nevertheless this new Philippine policy represented a substantial 
shift in U.S. policy and strategic thinking.  MacArthur received 
notification that "... plans are maturing to send you [the] fol- 
lowing reinforcements:  one squadron of nine [of the] most modern 
B-seventeen Flying Fortresses from Hawaii as soon as availability 
of staging fields [at] Wake Island and New Britain [are] as- 
sured . . . ." 
On August 1 President Roosevelt enlarged the economic block- 
ade of Japan to include "... wood pulp, metals, and manufactures, 
machinery and vehicles, rubber and manufactures, chemicals and re- 
lated products . . ."as well as high grade aviation petroleum 
products.   Roosevelt and his top military advisers agreed that 
military and economic pressure were effective weapons, especially 
in the Far East. 
General Marshall had three reasons for altering America's 
strategy in the summer of 1941; first, he ". . . knew and loved the 
Philippines . . .", second, Marshall recommended that MacArthur be 
given command of USAFFE.  Third, and by far the most important, as 
he testified in December 1945 before the Pearl Harbor Committee, 
"We felt that we could block the Japanese advance and block their 
entry into the war by their fear of what would happen if they 
couldn't take the Philippines, and we could maintain heavy bombers 
9 
on that island."  Marshall's decision to reinforce the Philippines 
was approved by Secretary of War Stimson.  On August 4, 1941, the 
-14- 
Secretary recorded in his diary, "We are sending nine of our big 
flying fortress to the Philippines to help in the defense there. 
..."   These had been "... dispatched in the hope that enough 
of them could be sent in the next three or four months, to serve 
as a real deterrent to further Japanese action." 
Chief of Staff George Marshall partially based his Philip- 
pine reinforcement decision on General Arnold's July 19th recom- 
mendations. The Chief of the Army Air Force had recommended that 
the AAF deploy in the Philippines "... four heavy bombardment 
groups, to consist of 272 aircraft with 68 in reserve and an ad- 
12 ditional two pursuit groups of 130 planes [each] . . . ."   Both 
Marshall and Arnold believed that a concentration of heavy bombers 
would force the Japanese Imperial Government to revise or at least 
reconsider her southward expansion program. 
Arnold's proposal, placing a total of 340 heavy bombers and 
260 pursuit planes in the Far East, was largely based on forthcom- 
ing production.  Even by August 1941, the AAF had only 109 B-17's; 
of those, 30 were located outside the continental United States 
13 
with 21 in Hawaii, 8 in Panama, and 1 in Alaska.   Arnold knew 
that between June 1941 and July 1942, 14 heavy bombardment groups 
were to be fitted with both personnel and planes. Though none of 
those were scheduled for the Philippine Islands, nine groups were 
to remain within the continental United States, two groups were to 
14 go to Hawaii and one each to Alaska, Puerto Rico and Trinidad. 
General Arnold was also aware that between September and December 
of 1941, a total of 282 Flying Fortresses were to be produced.  Of 
-15- 
these, the AAF was to receive 181, the U.S. Navy 5, and the British 
Royal Air Force (RAF) the remaining 96. During January and Febru- 
ary of the following year, an additional 184 B-17's would be ready. 
The AAF was to obtain 157, and the RAF, 27.1 Production of Flying 
Fortress would steadily increase after September 1941. General Ar- 
nold recognized that there were other problems such as air routes, 
air fields, supplies and defending the Flying Fortresses [when they 
were on the ground]. 
While the U.S. War Department was working to reinforce the 
Philippines with modern equipment, President Roosevelt sought to 
meet with Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill.  In early 
August, F.D.R. had wanted "... a firsthand view of the changed 
situation [Germany's attack on Russia], so he sent Hopkins to 
London in mid-July to arrange a conference with Churchill." 
Hopkins not only set up the Roosevelt-Churchill summit but also 
went to Russia and talked directly to Stalin about the Russian 
situation, militarily and materially.  The secret conference in 
Argentia, Newfoundland August 9-12, 1941 between Franklin D. Roose- 
velt and Winston S. Churchill dealt extensively with U.S.-British 
cooperation, most notably in regard to Japan.  That series of 
meetings between the two leaders was a full scale summit conference 
because the British and United States Chiefs of Staff, the com- 
manders of the Air Forces, members of the war plans divisions, 
Under Secretary of State Welles, and Sir Alexander Cadogen of the 
British Foreign Office attended. 
Although the conference ostensibly "... grew out of the 
-16- 
situation created by Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union", Japan 
and the Far Eastern situation headed the list of topics for discus- 
17 
sion at Argentia.   The British were pressing for a stronger and 
more overt U.S. policy in the Far East because "Mr. Churchill was 
harassed by the pleas from the Pacific Dominions and the Dutch that 
he secure some promise of American military aid in the event of a 
18 
Japanese attack."   At the first general meeting, August 9, 19H1, 
Churchill elucidated on the war and "Expressing deep concern over 
Japanese aggression in the Far East, he proposed that the United 
States, Britain, and Russia warn Japan of their opposition to move- 
ment of troops into the Malay Peninsula or the Dutch East Indies." 
Roosevelt promised Churchill that the U.S. would serve diplomatic 
notice on the Japanese. 
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and British Perma- 
nent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Alexander Cadogen 
also discussed U.S.-Japanese relations. Welles indicated that the 
major objective of the U.S. in the Pacific was to avoid war with 
Japan because of the strain that it would create on the United 
20 States military forces and production activities.   Welles wrote: 
I trusted that the British Government 
would take the same view as that which 
I had indicated to Sir Alexander Cado- 
gen: namely, the dragging out of con- 
versations on this latest Japanese pro- 
posal to the utmost without the slight- 
est relaxation of the military or eco- 
nomic measures which had been taken. 
The Welles-Cadogen draft settlement on Japan was presented to Hull 
on August 15, 1941; the draft was a virtual ultimatum. Yet, "... 
-17- 
the statement which the President personally handed to Ambassador 
22 Nomura on August 17 carried [only] implications."   President 
Roosevelt warned the Ambassador that any further Japanese advance 
in the Southwest Pacific would force the U.S. Government to take 
countermeasures, even at the cost of war between the United States 
and Japan.   But obviously, "... discretion triumphed over valor 
and the warning to Japan, envisaged at Argentia as a major state 
paper, a virtual ultimatum, was reduced to a statement for the in- 
formation of the Japanese Ambassador." 
While the British argued for a tougher U.S. policy vis-a-vis 
Japan, they simultaneously pressed for more U.S. heavy bombers. 
General Arnold noted that the most recent British Program required 
all the Army Air Force's heavy bombers plus 6,000 that we, the 
United States, had on order. Arnold wrote, 
The British as usual asked for everything 
they wanted regardless of whether we have 
or ever will have an Air Force.  They 
never blinked an eye when they asked for 
100% of our production . . .  Fortunately 
we were able to get away without promis- 
ing or giving away everything we had.  As 
a matter of fact we might have lost every- 
thing we owned including our pants - but 
we didn't. 
Arnold further commented, "I think however that the conference was 
invaluable as it gave the British a much better understanding of 
our problems and certainly gave us a better understanding of not 
only their problems, but also their urgent desire to get everything 
they can regardless of [the] effect on the other fellow."   Arnold 
stated that Sir Marshall Freeman gracefully accepted the United 
-18- 
States refusal to send additional heavy bombers to England. 
General Arnold's refusal was partially based on one of the 
principles that Chief of Staff Marshall stated should guide Ameri- 
can military representatives at Argentia.  Namely that the Philip- 
pine Islands were going to be reinforced with B-17's,  While refus- 
ing to give Freeman any more Flying Fortresses, Arnold requested 
that a permanent air route to the Philippines via New Britain or 
27 Australia be established. 
The military men 00 Great Britain and the United States did 
agree on strategy affecting six items: aid to Russia, the seizure 
of the Azores, the reinforcement of the Philippines, what to do if 
Japan moved southward, Iceland's defense, and finally, the occupa- 
28 tion of the Canary Islands and the Cape Verde Islands.   Follow- 
ing the conference major efforts were expended to coordinate the 
U.S. build-up in the Far East with the available resources of our 
major Pacific ally, the United Kingdom.  Personnel and logistics 
problems for both Britain and the United States were complex, pri- 
marily because the Pacific Area was considered secondary to Europe 
by both nations. 
Secretary of War Stimson, after learning about the Newfound- 
land conference wrote, "... I found that what the practical Bri- 
tish were after was action and that they had no idea at all of how 
the cupboard was bare so far as the United States was concerned 
. . ." Stimson strongly criticized the British requests for heavy 
bombers, "... the fact that we are behind in those bombers ..." 
was largely due to British opposition to them. Now they "... 
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reversed their position ..." and were anxious to obtain as many 
flying fortresses as possible, "... the same type that they were 
29 knocking a year ago." 
After Argentia the reinforcement of the Philippine Islands 
began to gather momentum. However, the decision to reinforce the 
Philippines with B-17's was difficult to accomplish. The radical 
reversal in U.S. policy became possible for the United States only 
30 because of the availability of the Flying Fortresses.   The dra- 
matic change in the U.S. strategy towards the Philippines archi- 
pelago had been first proposed by General Arnold on July 19, 1941. 
Washington's belief in its new strategic deterrent for the Philip- 
pine Islands, wrote Dr. Pogue, was based on ". . . the Far Eastern 
commander's oversanguine estimates of the strength of his forces 
and General Marshall's overrating of the current capacity of the 
31 
heavy bomber.. . ."   Dr. Pogue's evaluation of the situation in 
the Philippines with regard to the B-17 might be very accurate; 
however, it underestimated the potential of an adequate force of 
B-17's in controlling Japanese southward expansion. 
Matloff and Snell, in their official history wrote: 
The notion that the Philippines could be 
defended, in spite of all the considera- 
tions that . . . led the planners so 
often to reject the idea, grew out of a 
new approach to the problem of operations 
in the western Pacific, involving the use 
of long-range Army bombers to neutralize 
Japanese offensive capabilities. 
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CHAPTER III 
"The Logistics of the Philippine Build-Up 
and Allied Cooperation" 
The Army Air Force pushed the investigation of the possi- 
bilities of alternate air routes for the heavy bombers assigned to 
the Far East.  Chief of the Air Staff Brig. General Carl Spaatz 
indicated the importance of these alternate routes in the imple- 
mentation of new Philippine policy:  "This matter is very urgent; 
it must be thought of in terms of weeks and not years; every pos- 
sible expedient must be visualized and utilized in order to com- 
plete this project in the minimum time."  General Spaatz also sent 
the following memorandum to the Air War Plans Division (AWPD): 
An immediate investigation will be under- 
taken and action initiated without delay 
to expediate and develop at the earliest 
possible moment, an air route from Hono- 
lulu to the Philippines for heavy bombers, 
in addition to the present proposed route: 
Hawaii - Midway - Wake - New Britain - 
Darwin - Philippines. This route is too 
exposed to attack and Wake Island is too 
difficult to defend. 
On August 14, the War Department acquired detailed informa- 
tion regarding both the Argentia Conference and the Philippine sit- 
uation.  General MacArthur received a memorandum from Colonel H.H. 
George, Air Corps Executive United States Army Forces Far East with 
3 
a detailed list of U.S. airplanes in the Far East: 
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U.S. Army 
Type Number 
B-18 17 
B-10 14 
P-40 31 
P-35 56 
P-26 12 
A-27 9 
OA-9 1 
0-46 9 
Z0-19E 4 
0-49 3 
C-39 1 
C-49 1 
Total - 158 
These figures indicated that the planes in the Philippines had no 
military value for the United States. 
The U.S. air arm in the Philippines was totally antiquated 
and inadequate. The task of changing in six months or less that in- 
adequate air force into a realistic deterrent to Japanese expansion 
was a difficult problem.  Brigadier General L.T. Gerow noted in his 
assessment: 
To offer a reasonable chance of success- 
ful defense of the Philippines, studies 
indicate necessary minimum reinforcements 
of: 
A composite Air Wing, 
An Infantry Division, 
An Antiaircraft Regiment, and 
Additional Harbor Defense Troops 
(Approximately 2300) .... 
The primary reasons, in the past, for the 
failure to undertake adequate defensive 
measures for the defense of the Philip- 
pine Islands were: 
a. Lack of funds 
b. Lack of personnel and equipment 
c. Inability of the Navy to pro- 
vide adequate support 
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The above reasons were no longer entirely controlling. Ap- 
proximately $52 million had recently been appropriated for the de- 
fense of the Philippines; equipment and troops were to be prepared 
shortly. Even airplane bombs in adequate supply were becoming 
available. 
The allocation of B-17's to the Philippines overcame the 
major obstacle to reinforcement - the Navy's inability to furnish 
adequate support. Naval reinforcement of the Philippine Islands 
had to come from Hawaii, a distance of 5,000 miles.  Naval supply 
shipping was being pressed to the limit in the Atlantic as well as 
in the Pacific. Air reinforcement would help alleviate the supply 
problem and would open the way for the U.S. to bypass the Japanese 
bases in the mandated islands.  It was hoped that the B-17's would 
decrease the logistical and military problems of the United States 
in the Pacific. 
General Gerow appraised the Far Eastern situation for the 
Chief of Staff on August 14: 
The present attitude of Japan indicates 
she may consider reduction of the Philip- 
pine Islands a prior requirement to con- 
summation of other plans for expansion. 
The ability of the Philippine Islands to 
withstand a determined attack with pre- 
sent means is doubtful. To enhance the 
probability of holding Luzon and, in any 
event, giving reasonable assurance of 
holding Manila Bay, further prompt rein- 
forcement of the Philippines is essen- 
tial.5 
The logistics problems were enormous in the United States as 
well as in the Philippines.  General Spaatz wrote regarding air 
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facilities in the Philippines: 
There is only one airdrome, Clark Field, 
Ft. Stotsenberg, suitable for use by 
heavy bombardment aircraft, at the pre- 
sent time. The runways at Nichols 
Field, Manila, are under construction 
and will not be completed before Octo- 
ber 1, 1941. When construction is com- 
pleted, this field will be suitable for 
use by heavy bombardment aircraft. 
General MacArthur, on August 19, 1941, forwarded to Washington in- 
formation pertaining to accommodations for additional planes at 
the existing airfields in the Philippine Islands. Three heavy bom- 
bardment squadrons could be handled immediately, in November an ad- 
ditional three, and in February 1942, four more squadrons.  It was 
"... estimated that an additional four fields to accommodate two 
pursuit and seven bomber squadrons could be completed within the 
six month period . . ."if the necessary construction equipment was 
7 
delivered on time to Manila. 
Major General Hugh J. Casey, General MacArthur's engineer, 
wrote in his official history Airfield and Base Development that 
construction of airdromes in the Philippines was managed ". . . in 
one of three ways: first, by Army Engineer units, of which two 
were available . . . second, by private contractors under contract 
to the U.S. Engineer Department; and third, by private contractors 
working under contract with the Civil Aeronautics Authority.. . ." 
Two principal means were employed to obtain land for the construc- 
tion of an airdrome, "... either through purchase or condemnation 
. . .", each of these "... was a long administrative process.. . . 
Even after all legal obstacles were overcome . . .", construction 
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was slow because of ". . . the shortage of heavy construction equip- 
ment."8 
The construction program begun in the Philippines during the 
summer had progressed so far that in October MacArthur wrote to Mar- 
shall, "A construction program was initiated without delay and is 
Q 
making excellent progress."  Nevertheless, the airfield situation 
in the Philippines in the Fall of 194-1 remained bleak, despite the 
fact that "... there were in the Philippines approximately 40 air- 
fields available for use by military aircraft and about 50 others 
which could be used in emergencies."   However, few runways ex- 
ceeded the 3,500 feet in length necessary for B-17's.  General Bre- 
reton, who commanded the United States Far East Air Forces, wrote in 
his diary October 8-9-10, 1941: 
It was well known in the War Department 
at this time that there were only two o 
landing fields in the Philippines from 
which heavy bombers could operate in 
the wet season ....  The landing area 
at Nichols Field near Manila was being 
enlarged to accommodate heavy bombers, 
but would not be completed for some 
months. 1 
In August 1941, "With Marshall's approval the Air Chief transferred 
units from commands in the U.S. and Hawaii and'earmarked 165 of the 
220 bombers scheduled for production in the U.S. by the end of Feb- 
1 2 
ruary 1942 for delivery to the Islands." 
The initial effort to strengthen the Philippines was initi- 
ated on August 30, 1941, when the War Department sent an ultra se- 
cret message to Manila.  "A flight from Hawaii to [the] Philippines 
is contemplated for nine B-17D airplanes about September fifth . . . 
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Clark Field at Fort Stotsenberg will be destination landing 
13 field."   Chief of Staff Marshall notified General MacArthur that 
"Further air reinforcements will be made as soon as your fields are 
14 
sufficiently advanced to accommodate additional planes."   To al- 
leviate that situation, the Philippines were given "... the high- 
est priority in the War Department ..." and MacArthur was assured 
15 
of ". . . the funds needed for airfield construction . . . ." 
Plans matured to build and extend airfields in the Philippine Is- 
lands.  The fields were:  Nichols, Clark, Kindley, O'Donnell, Hala- 
banz, several sites on the Bataan Peninsula, as well as several 
smaller fields in Luzon. 
On September 9, General Marshall informed the Commanding 
General USAFFE Douglas MacArthur that an increase in his heavy 
bombers ". . . to a group of four combat squadrons ..." was again 
proposed, only the availability of airfield accommodations was pre- 
venting their dispatch. ' Also, on September 9th, the Chief of 
Staff informed President Roosevelt that General MacArthur sent his 
'  "... personal appreciation for the splendid support ..." that 
he was receiving from the War Department.  The President was told 
that "The departure of the Flying Fortress squadron from Hawaii was 
delayed because of the runway at Wake Island.  It is now en route 
and arrived at New Britain this morning.  It should be in Manila 
18 tomorrow, or the next day." 
On September 28, MacArthur radioed the Adjutant General: 
"None of [the] stops along [the] route can adequately accommodate 
more than nine aircraft at one time.  [I] recommend that squadrons 
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of nine airplanes each take off [with] at least two day intervals 
. . .  Parking facilities [at] Wake [are] limited to nine air- 
planes."19 
Other problems faced the deployment of B-17's in the Philip- 
pines.  One was the question of the combat worthiness of the Flying 
Fortresses.  On September 29, General Arnold was notified that "The 
initial results of the R.A.F.'s employment of American B-17's on 
daylight Continental bombing missions thus far are not encouraging." 
The R.A.F. reported that "... 46% of all assigned missions aban- 
doned (primary or secondary targets), Mechanical difficulties 
caused 5% [and] 41% bad weather conditions." The memo Arnold re- 
ceived indicated mild reservations about the 41% aborted missions 
caused by bad weather.  "If bad weather was responsible for the 
abandonment of such a high percentage of operational missions, it 
is indicative of the imperative necessity of increasing the accu- 
racy of the R.A.F. Continental meteorological reports in order to 
minimize the risk of American equipment unnecessarily falling into 
the hands of the Germans." The report noted that ". . . if other 
operational factors . . . are responsible for this high percentage 
of abandoned missions, immediate action and research ..." should 
be started to correct the problems.  However, General Arnold was 
informed that the B-17 was able ". . .to withstand terrific enemy 
fire." The reports that Arnold received from England indicated 
that the fighting ability of the Flying Fortresses had to be im- 
proved. The B-17's that the War Department had scheduled to send 
to the Philippines in January, February, and March of 1942 were 
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improved models.  Their improvement was due principally to the ac- 
tion that the Flying Fortresses experienced over Europe. 
Arnold believed the R.A.F. had used the B-17's incorrectly 
and concluded: 
The success or failure of the initial re- 
sults of the B-17's bombing operations 
will have an effect, far in excess of its 
actual operational importance on the at- 
titude of the R.A.F., the British, and 
American people toward the B-17 as a 
fighting plane. The excellent qualities 
of a fighting plane may go unrecognized 
for months ijf the plane is not properly 
introduced. 
Therefore the AAF was determined that the Philippine build-up dem- 
onstrate to the American people the value of heavy bombers in 
halting Japan. 
Another immense problem proved to be personnel.  In 1941 a 
year after the RAF and the Luftwaffe engaged in air battles at 
30,000 feet and higher, "In the entire country we had just two com- 
plete crews who had had as much as one hour of combat training in 
21 four-engine bombers above 20,000 feet."   General Brereton, Com- 
mander of the Far East Air Forces wrote, 
One very serious shortcoming was the 
lack of trained personnel ....  I 
fully understood the inadequacy of 
the Air Forces. We were definitely a 
third-rate air power.  In the Third Air 
Force in September we had only three 
Bombardment Groups and a mere 17 quali- 
fied first pilots and 22 qualified co- 
pilots for four-motored bombers.2^ 
The available trained personnel in the U.S. Air Force Combat Com- 
23 
mand on October 1, 1941 totaled: 
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Bomb. Bomb. 
Heavy Medium 
First Pilots 64 72 
Co-Pilots 90 108 
Navigators 56 46 
Bombardiers 66 38 
Radio Operators 129 117 
Aerial Engineers 169 103 
Bomb. 
Light  Pursuit 
25      171 
34 
Although personnel and material were scarce, the top echelon 
of the U.S. Government believed that it was possible to complete 
the Far Eastern build-up. Thus at 9:15 A.M. on September 30, 1941, 
Hull met with Stimson, Knox, Stark, and Marshall; the meeting was 
called at Secretary of State Hull's request. Stimson wrote, "... 
we wandered all over the face of the whole world on our discussion. 
Hull seemed to have West Africa in his head and we ended up with a 
fine disquisition on what we were doing in the Philippines by Gen- 
24 
eral Marshall."   Four of the highest political and military offi- 
cials in the United States Government had been fully briefed on the 
continued reinforcement of the Philippine Islands.  That same day, 
General Arnold informed General Marshall on the development of ad- 
ditional air routes from Hawaii to the Philippine Islands. Arnold 
had directed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to 
take any necessary action "... which will assure the early com- 
pletion of the airports that are required for the movement of heavy 
bombardment aircraft between Hawaii and the Philippines." Arnold 
then noted that, "This matter is very urgent.  It must be thought 
25 
of in terms of weeks and not years." 
As General Arnold demonstrated the need for speed in the 
Philippine build-up, the War Department informed several potential 
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U.S. allies about the American program in the Far East.  Secretary 
Stimson had informed the Chinese and the Dutch of our planned build- 
up in the Far East and General Gerow, on September 16, 1941, gave 
the British Joint Staff Mission detailed information on the Philip- 
pine reinforcement. Allied cooperation and coordination had picked 
up momentum after the Atlantic Conference and the U.S. build-up in 
the Far East would be more effective with the assistance of the BCD 
nations (Britain, China, and the Netherlands). 
War Department studies indicate that 
air defense of [the] Philippines - 
Australia - Dutch East Indies - Singa- 
pore Area would be materially streng- 
thened if operating fields with neces- 
sary supplies and equipment including 
bombs, ammunition, gasoline and oil, 
and service detachments at Singapore, 
Port Darwin, Rabaul, and Port Moresby 
and advanced air depot facilities at 
Rockhampton were available to the 
United States. 
The above message was sent to General MacArthur on September 30, 
1941; it contained orders to contact the appropriate authorities 
and obtain permission to use their facilities in the above mentioned 
areas. This memo emphasized the need for an airfield "... between 
Singapore and Manila suitable for operations of B-17 type bombers 
. . ."; such a field was "... essential to our probable opera- 
26 
tions."   MacArthur was further directed to ask the British to de- 
velop an airfield in North Borneo to aid in controlling the Japanese 
in the South China Sea. The Commanding General USAFFE was also told 
that he would receive 35 B-24 bombers along with 136 operational 
heavy bombers (along with 34 additional B-17's in reserve). As 
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General Gerow stated, "It is planned to augment [the] Philippine 
27 
air units as rapidly as airplanes and units become available." 
With the build-up in the Philippines escalating, code desig- 
nations for that augmentation were established - Plum for troops 
28 
and Peach for material.   On October 1, 1941, General MacArthur 
notified the Adjutant General that War Department Operations Plan, 
Rainbow 5, needed some revision.  Rainbow 5 had been approved by 
the Secretary of War on June 2, 1941 and 
Since that time a new Command, the United 
States Army Air Forces in the Far East, 
has been constituted. . . .  The Philip- 
pine Islands are now being organized into 
a potential Theater of Operations, with a 
force of from eleven to thirteen divi- 
sions with corresponding Air Corps and 
Army Troops. 
MacArthur advised that the mission of defending only Manila Bay 
should be expanded ". . .to include the Defense of the Philippine 
Islands . . . ." The Commanding General of USAFFE believed that, 
"... the strength and composition of the defense forces pro- 
jected here are believed to be sufficient to accomplish such a mis- 
t.29 
sion." 
In order to facilitate the air power build-up in the Philip- 
pines, General MacArthur approved the selection of General Brereton 
to command the Army Air Forces in the Far East. Brereton later 
wrote: 
Apparently I had been selected because 
of the fact that build-up of the Far 
East Air Force in its early stages 
would be largely one of preparing ser- 
vices and facilities.  Airplanes, air- 
fields, pilots, and all the things 
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needed to run an air force were practi- 
cally nonexistent in the Philippines. 
General Brereton discussed the build-up with General Arnold on 
October 5, 1941; at that time the contemplated force for the Philip- 
pines "... was approximately four Bombardment Groups, four Fighter 
Groups, the necessary air warning installations, and various asso- 
ciated air and ground units . . . ." General Brereton, however, was 
very skeptical about the build-up in the Philippines. He told Gen- 
eral Arnold that it was "... extremely hazardous to place bomber 
forces in any sensitive area without first having provided the nec- 
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essary fighter cover and air warning services. ..."   Brereton 
disagreed with a plan which would put unprotected B-17's in the 
Philippines.  He said, "The enemy would have everything to gain by 
neutralizing our bomber force before the arrival of units necessary 
for their protection." After two days of discussions with General 
Arnold, Brereton voiced his criticism of the Philippine heavy bomber 
build-up to the Chief of Staff. Marshall told Brereton that "... 
the hazards involved were recognized. Both [Arnold and Marshall] 
32 
were aware that it was a calculated risk." 
During September, the War Department had become more cogni- 
zant of the logistical problems involved in the heavy bomber build- 
up in the Far East. Those problems, although never fully resolved, 
were nonetheless energetically pursued. The War Department's abil- 
ity to reinforce the Philippines with B-17's was partially impeded 
by the condition as well as the number of airfields in the Philip- 
pines. 
-32- 
The fact that the War Department planned and partially com- 
pleted the Philippine build-up does not mean that Secretary Stim- 
son conceived the idea.  Richard Current, in his biography of Henry 
L. Stimson, exaggerated the role that the Secretary of War played 
in the planning of the build-up in the Far East when he wrote, "His 
idea was to make the Philippines a base for B-17 bombers which could 
attack any Japanese expedition daring to move southward past the is- 
lands. He  wanted to put in the Philippines at least a hundred of 
33 
the Flying Fortresses . . . ."   The idea for air reinforcement of 
the Philippines was undeniably Arnold's and "... the main strate- 
gic decision on the more aggressive policy in the Philippines was 
34 
made by Marshall."   Secretary Stimson did play a significant role 
in the air reinforcement in the Philippines because, along with 
Marshall and Arnold, he vigorously urged for these reinforcements. 
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CHAPTER IV 
"Roosevelt and the B-17's" 
As the United States was implementing its radical new strate- 
gic policy in the Philippine Islands, first Russia, then Britain 
pressured President Roosevelt for more B-17's.  In September, Mar- 
shall and Stimson successfully fought off Roosevelt's 50-50 idea 
concerning B-17's.  Their action enabled the Far Eastern build-up to 
continue, and the President's desire to give the British more heavy 
bombers was also temporarily frustrated.  It is apparent that Ar- 
nold's support for the B-17 build-up in the Philippines was moti- 
vated by his distrust of the British handling of U.S. heavy bombers, 
and his fervent desire to develop an autonomous Army Air Force. 
Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, conferred on September 10 
with Marshall, McCloy, Aurand, and Harriman on the Russian aid prob- 
lem.  William S. Knudsen, when told of the proposed aid to Russia 
"... thought we were a little over generous in the number of four- 
engine bombers we were pre'pared to give up, . . ."in the months 
ahead.  Stimson informed Roosevelt ". . .of Marshall's courageous 
and generous attitude towards the amount of this proposal to the 
Russians.  I told him of the number of heavy bombers that we pro- 
posed to give and I told him that was especially generous. He 
2 
seemed to think so too."  Deliveries were to be made in 1942 after 
the Philippines build-up had been completed. 
Then, a few days later, F.D.R. irritated Stimson when he in- 
terfered "... into a matter about which he knew very little, 
. . ."3 Ambassador Oumansky along with General Gromov and Col. 
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Baidukov consulted with President Roosevelt on September 12, 1941 
and Roosevelt became "... intrigued with the romance of the 
thing, promised them five of our 5-engine [4-engine] bombers AT 
ONCE* for them to fly back in a picturesque gesture over Germany 
. . . and dropping something on Germany . . ."to boost Russian mo- 
rale. Stimson wrote that President Roosevelt had "butted into" 
this matter and characterized his offer as ". . . pure gesture". 
Stimson fully realized that five B-17's would not actually alter 
"... the Russian chance of winning the war." His adamant opposi- 
tion to Roosevelt's gesture was based on the assumption that "... 
those planes are vital at the present moment at the opposite end of 
the world ..." where they could significantly alter the U.S. mili- 
tary position vis-a-vis Japan.  Secretary Stimson was so ". . . dis- 
turbed over this ..." that he ". . . brought up the matter at 
Cabinet.  I didn't go into all the military secrets but I told them 
of the reversal of the strategy of the world .... The President 
was impressed and I think was very sorry for what he had done 
. . . ."  The Secretary of War then advised Soviet Ambassador Ou- 
mansky that it was impossible for the United States to fulfill Rus- 
5 
sian demands for B-17's.  However, Stimson, after conferring with 
the Air Corps, concluded that the U.S. Government could provide the 
Russians with B-25's.  These were available and were capable of per- 
forming the mission Roosevelt had in mind, that is, flying over Ger- 
many to Moscow. 
In the middle of September the British Joint Staff Mission 
^author's italics 
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had been fully informed of the U.S. build-up in the Philippines. 
The British also learned of two developments; first, they would re- 
ceive no immediate increase in their allocation of B-17's and sec- 
ond, almost all available B-17's were to be diverted to the Philip- 
pine Islands. 
At the Joint Board meeting on September 19, 1941 
The Far Eastern situation was reviewed 
by General Marshall.. . .  General Mar- 
shall stated that he was presenting in 
detail the Army plans for defending the 
Philippines, in order that the members 
of the Joint Board, and particularly 
the Navy personnel, might give their 
opinion as to the strategic effective- 
ness and influence which the augmented 
Philippine garrison might have. 
Admiral Richard Kelly Turner, U.S.N., Director, War Plans Division, 
Office of Naval Operations discussed the Far Eastern strategic sit- 
uation from the Navy's perspective. Turner outlined possible Navy 
measures that could be used against a Japanese thrust toward the 
South. 
The members of the Board concurred in 
the belief that a defensive force, of 
the composition and size as outlined 
by General Marshall, would have a pro- 
found strategic effect and that it 
might be the decisive element in deter- 
ring Japan from undertaking a Pacific 
War.8 
When the British pressured Roosevelt for B-17's, their 
situation was vastly different from the Russian. The U.S. had been 
giving aid to Great Britain for over a year and ^end-Lease was 
passed to assist the British against Hitler's Germany. Russia was 
given aid only because of its potential help for England.  The 
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results, however, were the same - no additional heavy bombers were 
deployed to either of them.  Stimson's decision not to give the 
British additional Flying Fortresses was based upon the advice of 
Robert A. Lovett and General Arnold.  Lovett, in his memo "Need for 
Heavy Bombers" dated September 22, quoted the British Chiefs of 
Staff:  '"It is in bombing, on a scale undreamt of in the last war, 
that we find the new weapon on which we must principally depend for 
the destruction of German economic life and morale.'" Lovett also 
emphasized the "... vital importance of heavy bombers in the pre- 
sent strategical situation . . .  Even though we do not know all 
of the reasons which lead the British to their conclusion ..." 
concerning the vital necessity of heavy bombers.  Lovett's memo 
specifically dealt with reasons for maintaining the high priority 
status given to the B-17's in the United States rearmament.  His 
argument also provided aid for those in favor of increasing the 
number of heavy bombers for the British:  "Accordingly, in planning 
for the future it is felt that . . . the British need for heavy 
bombers should be taken seriously and given, every possible assist- 
„9 
ance." 
General Arnold also provided Secretary of War Stimson with 
definite reasons to maintain the British allocation of B-17's and 
not permit them an increase.  "Medium bombers, light bombers and 
pursuit airplanes are suitable to be exported to England to insure 
survival of the United Kingdom as a base for air operations." 
Arnold, like Lovett, realized that "Only heavy bombers are suit- 
able for a decisive air offensive against Germany." Yet the Chief 
-37- 
of Air Corps stated that 
It is therefore mandatory that the mini- 
mum force required for defense of the 
United States and its overseas posses- 
sions be established.  At least 11 groups 
of heavy bombers are necessary to meet 
the minimum requirement.  Eecause of the 
distances involved, medium bombers alone 
are incapable of meeting these require- 
ments (AWPD-2). 
The Secretary of War, thereupon, wrote President Roosevelt re- 
garding his September 18 request for a 50-50 split of B-17's.  Harry 
Hopkins had warned Stimson that F.D.R, seemed ". , . hell bent on 
giving them that many. ..." Then on Tuesday, September 23, 1941, 
Secretary of War Stimson recorded in his diary "I finished and sent 
off to the President two letters of considerable importance today, 
one giving our final views on how many airplanes we could give up 
to foreign nations between now and the first of July next." Stimson 
noted "The only point with this issue which was hard was the 4- 
engine bomber.  We have peeled them down to a point where to give up 
any more on a 50-50 basis in my opinion would mean to dangerously 
impair the defenses of the United States." Stimson made his posi- 
tion     explicit^ 
After the most careful consideration I 
have concluded that I cannot approve of 
the application of that rule to the four- 
engine bomber class on which we have al- 
ready taken such heavy deferments. 
He included a chart indicating the precarious condition that existed 
concerning the B-17's. 
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Norm. Reduced Allotments Status After Exports 
Requirements Agreed to 9/ /HI Now Contemplated Disposition 
4 2 2 Phil. Islands 
3 2 2 Hawaii 
2 1 1 Panama 
1 1 1 Newfoundland 
2 1 1 Alaska 
2 1 1 Ice-Greenland 
1 0 0 Puerto Rico 
5 1 1 United States 
6 2 1 South America 
1 0 0 Mexico 
3 
30 groups 
0 
11 groups 
0 
10 groups 
ABC-1 (Engl.) 
The Secretary of War also pointed out that no airplanes were "... 
available for training of four-engine pilots, for reserve for ABC-1, 
12 
or for Puerto Rico...." 
Thus by September 23 the Philippine Islands, virtually writ- 
ten off three months earlier, had become the most significant pri- 
ority with regard to heavy bombers.  Henry L. Stimson radioed Doug- 
las MacArthur that he was closely following the Philippine build-up 
and was "... deeply grateful for the good wishes ..." that 
13 
MacArthur sent to him. 
On the 25th of September, Stimson informed Dr. T.V. Soong 
of the U.S. build-up in the Philippine Islands. 
I told him very briefly that we were 
planning to increase the air defenses 
of the Philippines.  I told him that 
I preferred to have this not announced 
or made particularly public but that 
he might tell the Generalissimo. 
Then, on the 30th, the War Secretary told Major General L.H. van 
K^   Oyen, Commander of the, General Royal Netherlands Ea§t Indian Air 
\ 
^ 
!/' 
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Forces, the four-engine bombers he was seeking were to be deployed 
in the Philippines.  Stimson also requested their cooperation 
"... with the whole scheme of defense." 
By the middle of October, while the War Department was con- 
centrating on the build-up of U.S. forces, especially in the Philip- 
pine Islands, President Roosevelt focused on increasing U.S. aid to 
Great Britain.  Earlier that month Roosevelt and Hopkins had unsuc- 
cessfully attempted to persuade Stimson to increase the British al- 
lotment of B-17's.  The Secretary's position was based upon proper 
strategic distribution for basic U.S. defense needs.  Then on 
October 13, Harry Hopkins reopened the question for the President, 
There will be a minimum of 675 of these 
new 4-engine bombers made prior to 
July 1 and the schedule provides for 
the British to receive only about 124 
of these.  You can readily see that we 
could handle the Philippine and Hawaii 
business, as well as other important 
strategic centers, and still give the 
British 100 to 150 more than is now 
planned. 
Hopkins stated that he thought Hawaii and the Philippines required 
50 and 101 additional planes, respectively.  He wrote, "The Army 
plans to use the balance in Panama, the Caribbean, Newfoundland, 
Greenland, Iceland, et cetera.  I have no doubt that these big 
planes are needed in all of these places but it is simply a ques- 
17 tion of relative importance."   Not surprisingly, that same day 
F.D.R. replied to Stimson's September 22 letter, regarding the al- 
location of B-^'s. 
My dear Mr. Secretary ... I am in 
complete agreement about the necessity 
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for the 4-engine bombers in the Philip- 
pine Islands and Hawaii and I realize 
that all of our production of the two 
new types of bomber would be pretty well 
tied up for this purpose through Febru- 
ary.  I think, however, that the total 
distribution of these new bombers be- 
tween February 1942 and July 1942 as 
concerns our own needs and the British, 
is not a proper strategic distribution. 
It seems to me that after February more 
of these planes than have now been al- 
located should go to the British. 
The President specifically mentioned Newfoundland as less strategi- 
cally important than having "... the British flying these planes 
in combat...." Roosevelt requested that Stimson re-examine his 
decision regarding the strategic distribution of heavy bombers.  He 
inquired about the possibility of a ". . . distribution which would 
give 100 to 150 more of these 4-engine bombers to the British after 
February next but prior to July 1. . . ." Roosevelt directed the 
Secretary of War to make an early decision "... because of the 
necessity of equipping them [the heavy bombers] with Sperry equip- 
ment."18 
Stimson became discouraged when "[this] letter came from the 
President asking for more 4-engine bombers for the British, renew- 
ing the old fight." The original fight had taken place in Septem- 
ber, and Stimson thought that he had successfully dissuaded Presi- 
dent Roosevelt from giving the British an increased allotment of 
Flying Fortresses.  In mid-October, with the Philippine build-up 
in progress, the Secretary of War believed that the President was 
"... entirely in the hands of people who see only their side of 
the other nations. ..." Those advisers, the Secretary thought, 
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were "... wedded to the idea that with our weapons they can win 
the war." Stimson was sure that they could not, and that we would 
"... have to fight and that this nibbling away at our store of 
weapons ..." was reducing "... our weapons down to what I fear 
is a dangerous thing."  Stimson was well aware that Roosevelt was 
predisposed toward giving the British any material which could aid 
them against Germany.  Stimson foresaw possible conflicts between 
increasing the B-17's to Britain and the Philippines build-up.  "So 
I have another very serious issue with the President, which . . . 
will be very difficult for me to handle.  These weapons are going 
19 
to be needed in the Far East now. ..." 
General Arnold, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, helped with a 
two-page memorandum to the Secretary of War which contained de- 
tailed arguments against the "Diversion of Additional Heavy Bombers". 
Arnold raised the issue of sufficient heavy bombers in the Army Air 
Force "which can be concentrated where and when they are most 
needed." Arnold pointed out some of the logistical and personnel 
requirements necessary for training a heavy bombardment crew.  He 
also took issue over Newfoundland:  ". . .in view of the interna- 
tional situation at this time, Newfoundland is currently a logical 
place for stationing a group of heavy bombers.  Incidents such as 
that of the Bismarck may occur at any moment." Arnold continued, 
"The critical points at this writing are the Philippines and Alaska, 
..." He wrote that "The present plans for utilization of Army 
heavy bombers contemplate operations in the Philippines, Alaska, 
the Caribbean, Newfoundland, Iceland, and possible employment of 
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heavy bombers in connection with task forces in Natal, the Azores, 
and Dakar." Those plans, the one year training time required for a 
heavy bomber crew plus the probability of naval requests for patrol 
(this occurring when Iceland and Newfoundland have ice in their 
bays thus preventing patrol by Navy flying boats) eliminated the 
possibility of re-allocating heavy bombers to Britain.  The General 
summed up his opposition, "These efforts in the diversion of air- 
craft from the Army Air Forces is [sic] having a disastrous effect 
on the organization of an effective United States Army Air Force. 
The lack of airplanes in our tactical units is highly destructive 
to the morale of our flying personnel." General Arnold expanded 
his argument: 
Other factors enter the picture as soon 
as considerations are given to the pos- 
sibility of diverting B-24's from the 
Army Air Forces.  It is far more impor- 
tant as far as the United States is con- 
cerned to have these B-24's operating 
from the Philippines in the Far East 
where the situation is immediate and 
most critical, rather than to have them 
operating with doubtful efficiency on 
long range missions out of England 
against targets in the interior of Ger- 
many. The range of the B-24 makes it 
possible to reach interior Japan, while 
the range of the B-17 brings only the 
southern tip of Japan within our bomb- 
ing range.20 
Secretary Stimson consulted his military advisers (Marshall, 
Lovett, and Arnold), then wrote Roosevelt that it would be pos- 
sible to increase the number of heavy bombers allocated to the Bri- 
tish but to a very restricted degree. The Secretary of War con- 
sidered his arguments "... from two aspects:  first, that of the 
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physical ability to prepare these planes with Sperry equipment, and 
secondly, the more important element, strategic distribution in the 
light of military requirements." Of the 67 5 heavy bombers sched- 
uled to be produced by July 1942, 349 were B-17's (41 B-17D's and 
308 B-17E's) and 326 were B-24's (8 B-24C's and 318 B-24D's).  Con- 
version of B-17E's to handle the Sperry equipment was not feasible, 
because redesigning of plant facilities would disrupt the produc- 
tion of B-17E's.  Therefore, it was ". . . impossible for anyone in 
authority to agree to it." The disruption caused by fitting B-24D's 
with Sperry equipment would have been less severe.  "As to the 
matter of physical possibilities, the Army has on order at the pre- 
sent time only 128 consolidated B-24D's with Sperry equipment.  The 
Army Air Forces have already agreed to divert 94 of these planes re- 
taining a balance of 34." Under ideal conditions those 34 and ad- 
ditional 73 planes "... might physically be prepared for the Bri- 
tish.  If this were done, a total of 107 planes (34 plus 73) would 
represent the ..." total number possible to divert to Great Bri- 
tain.  In dealing with the second and more important aspect of the 
problem, Stimson wrote 
From the point of view of strategic 
necessities, as indicated in my letter 
of September 22, I feel that the ten 
groups representing the minimum safety 
requirements for the Army Air Forces 
should not at this time be reduced in 
light of military developments in both 
Far Eastern and European theatres. 
Stimson did, however, give the President some of the requested 
heavy bombers by suggesting 
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. . . that no firm commitment be taken to 
deliver additional 4-engine aircraft to 
the British beyond the 34 planes for which 
Sperry equipment is now in sight, and that 
the final decision be made in light of the 
military situation later in the winter. 
The B-24's concerned Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold because 
they were involved with the Far Eastern build-up.  USAFFE was to 
receive 30 B-24 bombers.22  During the fall of 1941, the U.S. Govern- 
ment continued to convince itself that it had an opportunity to 
hold the Philippines and restrain Japan. 
By September 19, 1941, the top military echelon of both Bri- 
tain and the United States had been informed of the Philippine build- 
up.  Considering the small number of heavy bombers possessed by the 
U.S., the air reinforcement of the Philippines was of major propor- 
tions. 
The Far East happened to be the only area where the U.S. 
could deploy its air force in 1941, and Roosevelt and Marshall hoped 
to prevent a Pacific war by a rapid U.S. build-up in the Philippines. 
When Roosevelt shifted from complete support of the Philippine re- 
inforcement towards sending more bombers to Great Britain and Russia, 
Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold successfully dissuaded him. Their re- 
armament program in the Philippine Islands was intended to maintain 
the status quo in the Far East.  The United States' firm resolve to 
halt Japanese southward expansion was reinforced on the wings of the 
Army Air Forces' heavy bomber, the B-17. 
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CHAPTER V 
"The Illusion of the War Department" 
Three days after the Secretary of War resolved the problems 
surrounding F.D.R.'s gestures to Russia and Britain, Stimson di- 
rected that General Gerow inform him regularly on ". . . the entire 
progress which is being made there in the Philippines rearmament, 
..." and to have a special study made of the strategic possi- 
bilities of situations. 
On October 4, Stimson sent a map to Hull (See Page 47) that 
emphasized the significance of the Far East build-up. "I am send- 
ing you by Stanley Hornbeck a map . . . which will show you the 
tremendous change which is being introduced by the new establish- 
2 
ment of the heavy bombers on the Philippine Islands."  The map in- 
dicated the possibility of shuttle-bombing Japan by using Vladivo- 
stok.  That idea exhilarated the Secretary of State.  Three days 
later Stimson discussed the situation in the Far East with one of 
Hull's advisers, Norman Davis, and Stimson noted that he 
. . . was glad to get his [Davis1] side- 
light on Hull's real reaction to it.  I 
have been working with him every chance 
I got, making frontal attacks on him, 
but he is such a cagey old bird I wasn't 
sure how far it would have affected him. 
But apparently he has got the idea in 
his head that it has really given a 
punch to his own diplomacy in the Far 
t»3S X •  •  •  • 
In his personal diary Secretary of War Stimson wrote:  "I spent 
this morning in rather lively work, trying to pep up certain things 
that are of vital importance.  First of all was the rearmament of 
-1+6- 
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the Philippines."  He had ordered that he be kept fully informed on 
the progress of the build-up in the Far East and in early October, 
Arnold wrote Stimson that the Philippines were to receive 95 B-17E*s 
out of a total production of 123 between October 1941 and February 
1942.  Arnold did recommend that "... due to uncertainties in pro- 
duction [of B-24,s] it is not believed that we should definitely 
make allocation to the Philippines prior to March."  The B-24 pro- 
duction estimates at that time were: November-2, December-8, Janu- 
ary -40 , February-45.  From the increased March production Arnold 
could recommend 35 B-24's be sent to the Philippine Islands.  Pro- 
gress in rearming the Philippines was well under way. 
During October, Washington became optimistic about the Far 
East. As Mark Watson has written, "The fact that these considerable 
additions were already on the way to the Philippine defense estab- 
lishment did much to improve the WPD confidence in the Far East 
7 
situation."  On October 8, General Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
received a memorandum from General Gerow which outlined the pre- 
sent U.S. position. 
Projected movements to the Philippines 
have been based on the concept that 
maximum results will be obtained from 
air reinforcements.. . . Considering 
only modern combat equipment, we now 
have in the Philippines 9 B-17*s and 
81 P-40's.  By December 31st, 1941, we 
will have 65 B-17's, 52 light bombers 
(A-24»s), and 131 pursuits, P-40's or 
similar ships. 
Further air reinforcements, con- 
templated as fast as equipment and 
shipping is available, in 1942 will 
bring these totals to 170 heavy bombers, 
86 light bombers, and 195 pursuit, a 
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total of 451 modern combat ships. 
General Gerow summarized the situation in a memorandum of 
October 8, 19m for the Secretary of War, "Strategic Concept of the 
Philippine Islands". He noted the importance of Vladivostok in 
supplying Russia and the probable closing of that vital harbor if 
Japan joined the German attack on Russia. This "... factor is of 
the utmost importance - the Vladivostok routes can handle some 
3,000 tons of supplies a day against 270 tons via the Persian Gulf 
route which will soon be cut." The reality of the Russian supply 
situation thus became a major factor in the War Department's hope 
that Soviet Russia would permit the United States to operate 
against Japan if necessary from airfields on Russian soil. 
The present deterrents should be main- 
tained and further strengthened by the 
provision of strong offensive air 
forces in the Philippines prepared to 
operate from bases in British posses- 
sions to the south and from eastern 
Russia.  The War Department is taking 
the lead in providing those forces. 
(See Map, Page 47) 
The ability of the United States to maintain a substantial heavy 
bomber force in the Philippines would force Japan to pay an enor- 
mous price to either conquer or bypass the islands.  To attack the 
Philippines, Japan would have to rely on carrier-based aviation as 
well as aircraft based on Taiwan. Gerow asserted that "The cost of 
this operation would be so great that Japan will hesitate to make 
the effort except as a last resort . . . ." General Gerow also 
stated that "Should Japan consider a movement north against Eastern 
Siberia, she must weigh the danger of committing major forces to an 
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operation of uncertain outcome and with British, Dutch, and U.S. 
forces in her rear." The Acting Associate Chief of Staff added 
"... the threat of heavy bombardment operating against the Japan- 
ese homeland ..." would remain even if the United States did not 
formally enter such a war.  Gerow believed that the threat would be 
real because of the commitment of the U.S. to supply Russia with 
war material. 
The concluding paragraph in General Gerow's strategic esti- 
mate of the Far Eastern situation indicated an overwhelming opti- 
mism among the war planners: 
Consideration of Japanese forces and h.er 
capabilities, leads to the conclusion 
that the air and ground units now avail- 
able or scheduled for dispatch to the 
Philippine Islands in the immediate fu- 
ture have changed the entire picture in 
the Asiatic Area.  The action taken by 
the War Department may well be the de- 
termining factor in Japan's eventual de- 
cision and, consequently, have vital 
bearing on the course of the war as a 
whole." 
The original purpose of deploying B-17's in the Philippines 
had been purely defensive; that purpose was modified by October, 
1941.  From the defense of the Philippine Islands, the WPD (War 
Plans Division) moved into offensive planning. Using the Islands 
as a base, another new objective was probably established on 
October 10:  "The Mission 1.  To bomb Tokyo effectively using B-17 
..10 type planes." 
The problem inherent in accomplishing the offensive mission 
had four facets: Airplanes, Bases and Crews (ABC's) and their 
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deployment.  The most difficult aspect of that problem was placing 
the ABC's "... within a circle, whose radius is the Radius of Ac- 
tion of a B-17 airplane carrying a load of bombs . . .", along with 
"... the establishment of a protective force.. . ." The bombing 
value of the Flying Fortress was divided into two functional sets 
of operational standards, Full Bomb Load and Half Bomb Load.  The 
former 
[was] obtained by loading the bomb bays 
to full capacity with any one of the fol- 
lowing loads: 
Twenty 100 lb. bombs or 
Fourteen 300 lb. bombs or 
Eight 500 lb. bombs or 
Eight 600 lb. bombs or 
Four 1000 lb. bombs or 
Two 2000 lb. bombs. 
The maximum radius of action with any of the above bomb loads was 
700 nautical miles, absolute 850 miles.  The second possibility, 
Half Bomb Load, had a radius of action of 900 miles and an absolute 
maximum of 1050 miles. 
The two Radius of Action Circles available with the B-17 
were plotted ". . . on a map of Asia, with Tokyo as a center. ..." 
(See Map, Page 47) Only from one region was it possible to bomb 
Tokyo by employing land based Flying Fortresses. That region was 
"... that portion of Russia in the vicinity of Vladivostok which 
is bounded on the west by the Manchoukus border, on the north by 
the Radius of Action Circle, and on the east by the Japan Sea." 
The directive did, however, present one other possibility, 
. . . that of a shuttle attack on Tokyo, 
using Clark Field, Guam or an advanced 
base in unoccupied China, such as Chuchow 
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in Cheking Province as the jump-off 
point and Vladivostok as the terminal. 
The distance from Clark Field on Luzon over Tokyo to Vladivostok was 
2240 nautical miles, beyond absolute range of 2100 nautical miles 
for the B-17's. The distance, however, from Chuchow over Tokyo to 
Vladivostok was 1800 nautical miles (via an all-water route, the 
distance to Tokyo was 2000 nautical miles) and from Guam was 1980 
nautical miles.  It was, therefore, obvious 
. . . that to effectively bomb Tokyo 
using B-17 type airplanes, strongly 
protected bases must be built in the 
Vladivostok area. Complete domina- 
tion of the air over these bases 
must be established by friendly pur- 
suit and anti-aircraft, and the Ja- 
panese ground forces must not be al- 
lowed to advance any further east 
than the present Siberian-Manchukua 
border. 
A group of 32 airplanes (4 combat squadrons) flying a bombing mis- 
sion to Tokyo would require:  51,000 gallons of 100 octane gasoline, 
250 gallons of oil, and under ideal conditions 2800 tons of bombs 
(mostly 300 lb. and 600 lb. bombs).  Using those figures "It would 
take ten groups of 40 squadrons or 320 airplanes to do the job with- 
in a reasonable time, kept up to full strength from a replacement 
center. "^ 
The study "To Bomb Tokyo" mentioned the vulnerability of Ja- 
panese shipping lanes from B-17's based at Clark Field.  Marshall, 
later testified that the U.S. was attempting to control Japanese 
12 
shipping.   That possibility, however, noted WPD, was "Beyond the 
13 
scope of this study . . . ." 
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General Arnold wrote General MacArthur a letter in mid- 
October to explain the role of the Air Force in the Far East.  Un- 
like the study that dealt with the bombing of Tokyo, Arnold's letter 
was a more accurate assessment of the situation: 
As we see it over here, air operations 
in connection with the Philippines di- 
vide themselves into two parts.  First, 
organization of a route from the United 
States to the Philippines for ferrying 
larger types of airplanes, such as 
B-17*s and B-24's.  Second, the actual 
operation of our aircraft in the Phil- 
ippines - Singapore - Australia - New 
Britain area. 
Also in that letter, General Arnold revealed his personal skepticism 
concerning the possible use of Vladivostok for U.S. air operations 
against Japan. 
During October 1941, the War Department began to perceive the 
situation through its new strategic concept.  The War Department's 
own combat estimate of Japanese and Philippine Forces indicates how 
far adrift from reality the WPD was in October 1941: 
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1.  JAPANESE FORCES 
Army;  68 plus 15 depot divisions; strength:  2,000,000. 
Reserves:  3,500,000. 
Airplanes: 114 Army Squadrons and 124 Navy Squadrons. 
Total combat planes:  3,743. 
Navy: 10 Battleships, 18 Heavy Cruisers, 20 Light Cruisers, 
129 Destroyers, and 72 Submarines. Total personnel: 
180,000. 
2.  PHILIPPINE FORCES 
Now Proposed Increases By 
29 ,000 
U.S. Army 
Tank Bn (54) 500 Nov. 
Tank Destroyers (25) Nov. 
Light Bomb Group 900 Nov. 
2 Pursuit Squadrons 500 Nov.-Dec. 
Service Units AC & Miscel 3,100 Nov.-Feb. 
Inf. Regt. 3,400 Nov.-Jan. 
FA Brig, plus 2 Bns. 5,500 Nov.-Jan. 
Heavy Bomb Group 1,100 
15,000 
Jan.-Feb., li 
Philippine Army 25 ,000 66,000 Dec. 
TOTAL —  54,000    81,000 
TOTAL FORCES IN PHILIPPINES, January, 1942:  135,000. 
Airplanes: 
Now 
Heavy Bombers 9 
Light Bombers 
Pursuit      81 
90 
Proposed Totals by: 
44 Oct.-Dec, »41 
52 Nov., '41 
131 Nov.-Dec, '41 
227 
170 Feb.-Oct., '42 
86 Feb.-Oct., '42 
195 Feb.-Oct., '42 
451 
Navy:  (Asiatic Fleet) 1 Heavy Cruiser, 1 Light Cruiser, 
13 Destroyers, 17 Submarines, 1 Airplane Tender, 
24 Patrol Planes. 
Reinforcements by additional submarines and patrol planes 
contemplated. 
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The desperate position of the U.S. in the Philippine Islands can be 
even more clearly seen when we remember that "In the entire country 
we had just two complete crews who had had as much as one hour of 
combat training in four-engine bombers above 20,000 feet.. . .  In 
the entire Air Force Combat Command we had only 33 heavy bomber 
crews trained for combat October 1." 
On October 20, 1941, Stimson spent his entire morning draft- 
ing a ". . . proposed letter to the President." Secretary Stimson 
considered the letter an ". . . important one, stating the strategy 
of the United States . . . giving an entirely new idea of the func- 
tions of the Air Corps from what I think the President has." Stim- 
son worked closely with Marshall, Arnold, Lovett, and Gerow on the 
strategy. Stimson believed that the statement of strategy was nec- 
essary "... because the President has evidently made up his mind 
to try to put this on pretty high ground and pretty broad ground, 
..." The Secretary believed that the strategy had been "... 
worked out and the description of our interests makes a pretty im- 
pressive document. ..." Stimson read the document to Bundy and 
McCloy who "... had made themselves, as they said, the Devil's ad- 
17 
vocate to try to beat me, but they thought I was sound." 
This letter indicated that the United States recognized air 
war planning in the modern era.  (The full text is in Appendix II.) 
The essence of the strategy was to have available large numbers of 
heavy bombers. The entire problem of heavy bomber distribution was 
. . . really not a static but dynamic ques- 
tion. . . . These new four-engine bombers 
now coming off the assembly line should 
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constitute a great pool of American power 
applicable with speed and mobility to the 
respective spots where in the interests 
of our national strategy of defense it is 
important that such power should be ap- 
plied.18 
This strategic doctrine puzzled Franklin Roosevelt.  The 
President, on October 25, requested that Harry Hopkins "Please read 
19 
and speak to me about this.  I am a bit bewildered."   The proper 
strategic distribution and national strategy of defense became moot 
points after Pearl Harbor.  Harry Hopkins' December 9th memorandum 
on this doctrine, to Miss Tully, the President's personal secretary, 
attests to that:  "In the light of what happened in the last day or 
two this letter may be filed.  It is not important for the President 
20 
to take any further action on this matter at this time." 
General Gerow believed that deployment of Flying Fortresses 
in the Philippine Archipelago would prove to be the decisive factor 
in the Far East.  When General Brereton departed for the Philippines, 
General Marshall gave him "... detailed instructions about the 
Philippine situation, [and Marshall] stressed the change in the 
21 
strategic importance of the Islands."   General Brereton observed 
that the personnel in the War Department believed that hostilities 
with Japan, at the earliest, would commence in April, 19U2.  "It was 
the hope of our Government that the presence of a powerful air force 
in the Philippines, in addition to a well-trained Army, would serve 
22 
as a strong argument to enforce the American viewpoint on Japan." 
The War Department's optimistic forecast was based more on 
hope than reality.  The perspective of the war planners had been 
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altered by their new strategic concept of the Philippine Islands. 
Unfortunately, that alteration obscured the War Department's vision 
of the power realities that existed in the Pacific during the fall 
of 1941. 
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CHAPTER VI 
"U.S. Negotiations with Japan" 
In the middle of October, Prime Minister Konoye resigned and 
Minister of War Hideki Tojo replaced him.  The Prime Minister had 
been losing political support when the early deadline for imple- 
menting war plans was reached, and so Konoye felt his situation 
hopeless. He tried to persuade Tojo to accept a temporary evacua- 
tion from China with the "... understanding that some arrangement 
would be made for the occupation of certain key localities later 
on."  However, Tojo remained adamant on the China issue believing 
that "... the objective of the United States was to control the 
Far East ..." and ". . .if Japan were to begin to make conces- 
sions, Washington would probably make more and more demands, with- 
2 
out limit."  This interpretation that the Japanese military leaders 
had of Washington was crucial in the relations between the two na- 
tions.  As Langer and Gleason have written "They were convinced that 
the conversations with Washington held no hope of success and that 
the United States was simply playing for time, perhaps even prepar- 
3 
ing to attack."  Their assessment of Washington emphasized the im- 
portance of the Magruder Mission to China as well as the October 5 
conference among General MacArthur, Admiral Hart (Commander in Chief 
U.S. Asiatic Fleet), General Magruder, and Sir Robert Brooke-Popham 
(British Singapore Commander). 
The critical point for both the United States Government and 
the Imperial Japanese Government was the evacuation of troops from 
China.  On August 8, the Japanese proposed a meeting between Konoye 
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and Roosevelt.  The President was on his way to Argentia and Secre- 
tary of State Hull was not receptive to the idea.  Although Presi- 
dent Roosevelt at first seemed amenable to such a meeting, jt 
never matured. Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled Ambassador 
Nomura in Washington on October 13, that it was necessary for Roose- 
velt to meet with Konoye if there was to be any accommodation in 
Japanese-American relations. 
According to the decision of the Imperial 
Conference of September 6 the Japanese 
Government was to prepare to wage war if 
the negotiations with Washington had come 
to nothing by early October .... The 
projected Roosevelt-Konoye meeting had 
not materialized and Japan's economic 
situation was becoming desperate. 
The State Department, led by Cordell Hull, opposed President 
Roosevelt's meeting with Prime Minister Konoye.  Hull and his Far 
Eastern advisers did not place much hope in a diplomatic settlement 
between the U.S. and Japan.  Therefore "... when Hull and his 
staff read Grew's [September 6] report of the three-hour talk [with 
Konoye], they could not see that privacy changed Japanese ideas or 
tactics." 
Thus, the diplomatic positions of the U.S. and Japan were 
frozen, with no prospect of a meeting between Roosevelt and Konoye. 
Japanese Prime Minister Konoye was forced to resign on October 16 
and the next day, Minister of War Hideki Tojo became Japan's new 
Prime Minister. 
Tojo was given a "tabula rasa" by the Emperor and was not 
bound to the decision arrived at during the September 6 Imperial 
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Conference. Herbert Feis, however, described Tojo and his cabinet 
as ". . . men who had carried the war deep into China and for whom 
retreat would mean failure.  They were the men who made decisions 
7 
by a military timetable." 
The improving military posture of the United States in the 
Philippines, specifically, and in the Far East generally, hardened 
the negotiating position of Roosevelt and Hull. Furthermore, on a 
global scale, 
American defense production was gaining 
size and speed; the situation in the 
Atlantic was better; the British still 
had the Suez Canal; the Russians were 
holding before Moscow and winter was not 
far ahead. Japan could no longer deter- 
mine whether the war in Europe was to be 
won or lost. 
By, ". . . October the American Government was revealing more clearly 
9 
than it did in March that it would not compromise with Japan." 
Even if the U.S. build-up were completed, any U.S. pressure 
on the Japanese mainland would hinge on Russian assistance.  Any suc- 
cessful attempt to shuttle bomb mainland Japan depended upon air 
bases in the Vladivostok Area. The probability of the Russians al- 
lowing that kind of air operation at first appeared dim. However, 
towards the end of October, W. Averill Harriman (President Roose- 
velt's special representative) and Secretary of War Henry L. Stim- 
son discussed that very question. Harriman had met with Stalin and 
said that he (Stalin) 
. . . professes willingness to let us 
have all the information we desire as 
to the northeastern Siberia and Kam- 
chatka but was naturally desirous of 
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knowing how far we would go in helping 
them. ... I told him it was very im- 
portant for us to get further informa- 
tion about the air fields of Kamchatka 
and northeastern Siberia. 
Harriman then gave Stimson "... the map which Stalin had given to 
Chaney . . ."on that subject as well as ". . . Chaney's report to 
11 Harriman."   One week later Stimson urged Secretary Hull to aid in 
the acquisition of one or possibly two airfields near Vladivostok. 
Stimson was asked ". . .to draw up a statement of what we wanted 
12 
. . ."so that Hull could "... begin negotiations."   Langer and 
Gleason point out that not only was "Secretary Stimson ... an en- 
thusiastic supporter of the idea of rushing Flying Fortresses to the 
Philippines ..." but ". . .he preached this doctrine to the Presi- 
13 dent and to Secretary Hull."   Stimson argued for "... avoiding a 
showdown and . . . that no effort be spared to secure from the Rus- 
sians air bases in Siberia which should pose a threat of great 
14 bomber sweeps over Japan." 
On October 21 Stimson sent a letter to President Roosevelt 
explicitly stating the reasons for proper strategic distribution of 
four-engine bombers in a world contest, but most immediately in the 
Philippines. The Secretary of War also detailed the applied air 
doctrine of the Army Air Forces, especially in regard to the Far 
East.15 (See Appendix II) 
The explanation of a U.S. air power doctrine, the build-up in 
the Philippines and the narrowing of the U.S. negotiating position 
with Japan converged during October 1941. Secretary Stimson's op- 
timism about the possibilities of the B-17 build-up was reinforced 
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by MacArthur's sanguine reports'  "A construction program ... is 
making excellent progress ....  Good progress is being made in the 
development of air fields."   (Text of the letter from MacArthur to 
Marshall appears in Appendix III.) 
The Secretary's optimism and enthusiasm were encouraged 
during late October by information he received from "magic inter- 
cepts".  These were messages that the U.S. Government had obtained, 
17 
because it had broken the most sensitive Japanese codes.   On 
October 21, Tokyo received word from Davao, a U.S. air base in the 
Philippine Islands, that "Already several times a week planes are 
flying here, and it seems they are expecting large heavy bomber 
18 planes too, very soon."   This was part of a Navy M/frGXCintercept, 
and was probably the information Stimson referred to on October 28 
in his conversation with Hull.  On October 28 Hull asked Stimson if 
he favored an ". . . immediate declaration of war against Japan." 
Stimson stated that he did not, and that his "... purpose was to 
take advantage of this opportunity of strengthening our position in 
the Philippines by air and to use it as a means of strengthening 
his [Hull's] diplomatic arm in forcing the Japanese to keep away 
from Singapore and perhaps ... in good luck, to shake the Japan- 
ese out of the Axis."  Stimson told Hull that he was "... anxious 
to avoid any boasting about what we are doing or any flamboyant an- 
nouncement of the movements of the planes and the reinforcements." 
The Secretary of War wanted the Japanese to realize the serious na- 
ture of the United States build-up.  Stimson had "... reason to 
believe from some of the MAGIC information, ..." which the War 
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Department received, that the Japanese were becoming concerned. 
Hull told Stimson that the Japanese Emperor was ". . .on 
his side ..." and that the Emperor would accept the major points 
of U.S. policy.  In October, those points were, "... the evacua- 
tion of China, the equality of opportunity for commerce to all na- 
tions with China and the cessation by Japan of any movements of ag- 
gression." Hull said that ". . .if the Emperor could get it 
through, why we will be in a wonderful position." Stimson advised 
Hull that he ". . . was trying to . . . back him up" by accelerat- 
ing the Far East build-up.  The Secretary of War "... told Hull 
that all of my policy might be summed up in the homely old words of 
Theodore Roosevelt, 'Speak softly but carry a big stick.' What I 
wanted now . . . was a very short time to get that big stick into 
readiness." Naturally, Stimson did not want the magnitude of the 
proposed build-up in the Philippines to become widely known. The 
Secretary of War, therefore, cautioned the Secretary of State 
"... that the policy of the Army under me was to let actions 
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speak for themselves rather than to hail them in advance."   On 
October 31, in a memorandum to Marshall, Stimson proposed that the 
announcement regarding the rearmament of the Philippines simply 
state:  "As a routine initial strengthening of our Island outposts 
we are replacing obsolescent aircraft in the Philippines with 
modern combat planes." 
Near the end of October, Stimson explained to Captain Harold 
Balfour (The British Under Secretary of State for Air) the overall 
plan for reinforcing the Philippines as well as Newfoundland and 
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Iceland.  Stimson read Balfour the letter that he had sent to the 
President.  Although Balfour thought that Stimson's "... argument 
was very powerful . . .", he asked the Secretary about his position 
on the "... bombing of Germany and the necessity of it when it 
21 
came."   Stimson, although engrossed in the B-17 deployment in the 
Philippine Islands, did not lose sight of the basic American war 
plan.  The Secretary of War told Balfour on October 29 that he 
"... was all for ..." the bombing of Germany when the proper 
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time developed. 
The situation in the Far East was changing rapidly in the 
late fall.  A G-2 estimate on November 2, 1941 stated that 
Two heavy bombardment groups will be in 
the Philippines by February 1942, equip- 
ped with:  130 B-17 Airplanes, 35 B-24 
Airplanes. ... A shortage of over 65% 
of bombs required by the Army Air Forces 
in the Philippines now exists.  ...  A 
shortage of approximately 30,000,000 
rounds in 50 Col. ammunition exists for 
both ground units and air units set up 
for the Philippines.  This condition 
will persist for several months. 
The intelligence estimate noted that Japan was "... militarily 
overextended on the mainland of Asia, economically weak, and psycho- 
logically aware of the fact that her economic structure ..." was 
rapidly deteriorating. Although Japan might be ". . . reluctant to 
go to war with us, her political and economic situations demand ac- 
„
23 
tion." 
That evaluation, although superficially favorable to the 
U.S., failed to emphasize the fact that Japan's power was regionally 
strong. Although overextended, the logistical problem of reducing 
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such overextensions were not great. The Japanese air force had an 
estimated 5353 planes, which included 1069 heavy bombers (with an 
operating radius of about 700 miles).  The Japanese had on Taiwan 
some 1400 pursuit planes, 20 airfields with four suitable for heavy- 
bomber operations. Japan had suitable heavy bomber airfields at 
Amoy, Swatow, Canton (10 fields in this area), and French Indo- 
china.  Several combat airfields were also controlled by the Japan- 
ese in those areas.  "The Mission with which the United States is 
confronted is to prevent further encroachment of Japanese forces in 
Asia with particular respect to possible support of China in resist- 
24 ing an attack against Kunming."   To accomplish that mission the 
United States had about 250 airplanes available in the Philippines. 
Roosevelt and his advisers were placing their hope in drag- 
ging out negotiations with Japan until February or March, 1942.  On 
November 5, the Joint Board "... recapitulated in a memorandum to 
the President ... a basic statement of the military position, on 
25 
which alone the nation's foreign policy could be safely grounded." 
Marshall and Stark agreed that, "The primary objective ... is the 
defeat of Germany. ...  An unlimited offensive war should not be 
undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the 
combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous 
26 
enemy."   General Marshall and Admiral Stark also stated that 
War between the United States and Japan 
should be avoided while building up the 
defensive forces in the Far East, until 
such time as Japan attacks or directly 
threatens territories whose security to 
the United States is of very great im- 
portance.  Military action against Japan 
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should be undertaken only in one or more 
of the following contingencies: 
1) A direct act of war by Japanese 
armed forces against the territory or 
mandated territory of the United States, 
the British Commonwealth, or the Nether- 
lands East Indies; 
2) The movement of Japanese forces 
into Thailand (Siam) to the west of 100° 
East or south of 10° North; or into Por- 
tugueses Timor. New Caledonia or the Loy- 
alty Islands. 
Thus, early in November, Roosevelt's military advisers had drawn 
the line. 
President Roosevelt explained on November 9 to Balfour, Bri- 
tish Under Secretary of State for Air, that my ". . . present Ja- 
98 
panese policy is one'of stalling and holding off."   Balfour sought 
an increase in Britain's share of U.S. heavy bombers.but Roosevelt 
said that such a decision could not be reached unless the Japanese 
problem was settled.  Balfour wrote, 
If during the next few weeks this policy 
looks likely to succeed for some months 
ahead, or alternatively, if the Presi- 
dent can sign up for peace with Japan so 
as to ensure no sudden hostilities, then 
he will feel able at once to direct a 
further diversion of heavy bombers to 
U.K.  On the other hand, the Japanese 
situation may blow up in the very near 
future, in which case U.S.A. and U.K. 
Joint Staffs will have to get together 
and decide in the light of combined war 
strategy where such equipment as becomes 
available can be used. 
Washington closely coordinated its policies with London concerning 
the Far Eastern build-up.  F.D.R. and his chief advisers believed 
that by February or March of 194-2 the increase in the Army Air 
Forces in the Philippines "... might well be a deciding factor 
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in deterring Japan in operations in the area south and west of the 
Philippines." 
During the first two weeks in November the Japanese Govern- 
ment developed two plans (A and B) as the basis of negotiations with 
the U.S.  "The first, designed to bridge the gap between Tokyo's 
original proposal of May 12 and the American counter proposal of 
June 12, 1941. ..." That plan, designated Plan A, dealt with the 
three major obstacles between Japan and the United States.  Those 
were "... nondiscrimination in trade, Japan's association with 
Germany and Italy, and the evacuation of Japanese troops from 
China." The second plan (B) was ". . . to be presented only if a 
comprehensive agreement on Plan A could not be achieved, was in the 
nature of a modus vivendi:  the Japanese were to promise to desist 
from further expansion in return for relaxation of American econo- 
mic pressure." The Japanese military leaders, guided solely by 
strategic considerations, had little faith in the American "... 
desire to reach an agreement." Neither of the proposals (A or B) 
"... appealed to General Sugiyama, Chief of Staff of the Army." 
Admiral Shimada, Minister of Marine (Navy Minister), accurately in- 
dicated "... that if war came before the beginning of the north- 
east monsoon off Formosa and Malaya in December, the prospects for 
immediate success would be good." The strong military arguments 
notwithstanding, Japanese Foreign Minister Togo was able to obtain 
the approval of the military leaders in the continuation of the 
negotiations with the U.S.  However, "In anticipation of failure, 
plans and preparations were to be rushed forward so that military 
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31 
action, when finally decided upon, could be taken promptly." 
The diplomatic positions of the United States and Japan nar- 
rowed decisively during the fall of 1941. Negotiations were being 
dragged on by both nations, Japan in order to prepare for a surprise 
attack and the U.S. to continue a substantial build-up in the Phil- 
ippines. Neither nation wanted to end negotiations in November; 
Japan did not care after the first week of December. The United 
States Government had hoped to prolong diplomacy with Japan until 
February or March, 1942. 
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CHAPTER VII 
"The Results of the Build-Up" 
While negotiations continued with Japan, Chief of Staff Mar- 
shall met Saturday Morning, November 15, ". . . with representatives 
of the chief wire services of The New York Times, New York Herald 
Times, Time and Newsweek . . . ." General Marshall's primary con- 
cern "... was that nothing be leaked to the Japanese of his plans 
for the Philippines.  With planes being shifted from various parts 
of the country to west coast ports, it was only a matter of time 
until an enterprising reporter would break the story." The Chief of 
Staff believed "... that the best way to keep a secret out of the 
newspapers was to reveal it to responsible newsmen and then explain 
why it could not be printed." 
Thus seven newsmen received a detailed account cf the U.S. 
build-up in the Philippines.  That recapitulation even included the 
map of the Pacific with the various airfields, bases, and ranges of 
U.S. aircraft.  (See Page 47.)  Marshall also told them that the 
United States and Japan "... were on the brink of war." After re- 
vealing the extensive build-up, General Marshall said 
If the United States was allowed time 
to complete the build-up .... the 
President would then suddenly reveal 
to the moderate leaders of Japan the 
extent of the vast air force that 
menaced them. Perhaps, if they were 
allowed to save face, they would de- 
sist from their aggression. 
Marshall stated that the program required some luck and time, but 
was possible.  At one point, "General Marshall felt that the main 
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involvement in the Far East would be Naval, ..." yet during No- 
vember, 1941 the Chief of Staff felt the B-17's could be the major 
U.S. involvement in the Far East. 
Two days after Marshall's discussion with the seven newsmen, 
Roosevelt initiated a trial balloon among his advisers. The Presi- 
dent's idea was to offer Japan a truce, but that idea died on No- 
2 
vember 26, after several alterations by the Secretary of State. 
In the meantime, four days after his discussion with those 
reporters, General Marshall, convinced that the Army Air Forces* 
heavy bombers would balance the military power scales in the western 
Pacific, ordered that data be gathered for an air offensive against 
Japan.  He also wanted to know what information General Brereton 
took with him to the Philippine Islands and was informed that Brere- 
ton took "... separate Air Staff studies on the steel and petro- 
leum industries and on the electric power establishment in Japan." 
However, Marshall was reminded that General Brereton's "... dis- 
cussions were based upon the employment of the Philippine Air Force 
on the strategic defensive, ..." and the reason for that was 
simple:  "With the very small offensive force projected for the 
Philippine Air Force (never over two heavy bombardment groups), a 
sustained air offensive against the Japanese Empire was never dis- 
3 
cussed."  The only offensive operations conceived were limited to 
those against Japan's naval lines of communication. 
On November 24, 1941, General Gerow informed the Chief of 
Staff that even by January 1, 1942, the Philippines would only have 
83 heavy bombers.  The status of the United States Army Air Force 
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182 52" 
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in the Philippine Islands according to the above memorandum was: 
MODERN COMBAT 
L       H 
Misc.    Purs.   Bombers Bombers  Total 
On hand or en route 
By January 1, 1942 
TOTAL 
The maximum projected strength of the U.S. Army Air Force Far 
East was: 
Bomber Command - 2 groups (Hv) 
Interceptor Command - 2 groups (I) 
- Air Warning Service 
Light Bombardment - 1 group (L) 
Reconnaissance - 2 squadrons (Hv) 
Observation - 1 squadron 
Air Service Command5 
On this limited air force, Commander General MacArthur USAFFE based 
his defense of the Philippine Islands.  Thus MacArthur wrote that 
"The main operating area will be in central Luzon, with the advanced 
eschelon [sic] of the Bomber Command and all other headquarters con- 
centrated there, ..." but he also requested information regarding 
air objectives in Japan.  He in turn was sent "... a series of 
maps showing the location of approximately 600 industrial objectives, 
in Japan proper." The Commanding General was further informed that 
7 
he would receive more as soon as possible. 
By December 4, the facts accumulated by the U.S. Army indi- 
cated that Japan's steel industry had first priority.  Incendiary 
-71- 
attack also offered promise because "One Japanese city with a popula- 
tion of 7,000,000 has fire fighting equipment [of] approximately the 
same quantity as the city of Syracuse (population 200,000)." The re- 
port noted that incendiary attacks unless decisive would "... serve 
more to warn and train the population than toward any military end." 
The memorandum went on: 
Whereas the augmentation of the Army 
Air Forces in the Philippines has 
properly changed our conception of 
operations from a static defense of 
the islands to offensive air action 
in furtherance of the strategic de- 
fensive, I believe we are going much 
too far on the offensive side.  . . . 
If we endeavor to use this relatively 
very small force in a major' air of- 
fensive , we may be repeating the 
strategic blunders made when tanks 
and submarines were originally used 
in forces much too small to accom- 
plish decisive results .... 
Thus, General Marshall's dream of expanding the defense of the Phil- 
ippine Islands to an air offensive was challenged. 
Nevertheless, the attention of the War Department during the 
first week of December still focused on the Pacific.  Indicative of 
that concern was an unidentified memo included in the special Phil- 
ippine file.  The unmarked memo was attached to a memorandum for the 
Secretary, General Staff.  Dated December 1, 1941, it read: 
In view of the vital interests of the 
United States and of the British Com- 
monwealth and Netherlands East Indies 
these three powers will undertake hos- 
tilities against Japan in case Japan 
attacks or directly threatens the ter- 
ritory or mandated territory of the 
United States, the British Common- 
wealth, the Netherlands East Indies, 
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Portuguese Timor, New Caldonia, the 
Loyalty Islands, or moves any Japanese 
expeditionary forces into the China 
Sea south of latitude ten degrees 
north. 
The United States Government apparently had decided to attempt to 
stop certain Japanese attacks, even if they avoided all U.S. terri- 
tory.  Raymond Esthus wrote in 1963 that the Roosevelt Administration 
definitely provided the British Government with such assurances of 
armed intervention in the Far East.  Esthus concluded that Roosevelt 
would have gone through Congress for a declaration of war, and not 
committed U.S. forces without Congressional approval. 
In a conference on December 6 among Generals Marshall, Gerow, 
and General Sherman Miles of G-2, Stimson discussed the supplies 
headed to the Philippine Islands and heavy bombers which the U.S. 
was desperately trying to fly to the Islands. Secretary Stimson 
noted in his diary, the "... atmosphere indicated that something 
was going to happen." 
Much had been accomplished in the Far Eastern build-up, but 
much more had been anticipated. The final memorandum prior to the 
war prepared for Secretary of War Stimson regarding the Philippine 
build-up, indicated that even by December 6, only 35 heavy bombers 
were in the Philippines but that an additional 48 were to leave 
12 for the islands by December 10. 
By this time, the Japanese had also developed plans against 
the Philippine Islands.  Magic intercepts had indicated in late 
October that the Japanese were concerned with the U.S. reinforce- 
ment of the Philippines.  In an article published in 1955 General 
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Shimada, who served in the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War 
II, wrote concerning the late fall of 1941/ "In the Philippines, we 
estimated that our only serious opposition would come from the 
United States Armed Forces stationed there, and that they, in all 
probability would not be augmented after the outbreak of war." The 
Japanese assigned the major air phase of the Philippine Islands in- 
vasion to their navy.  "This was mainly because of the much shorter 
combat range of Army planes, which had been designed primarily for 
a continental war against Russia . . . ." Thus, every Zero fighter 
plane that the Japanese Navy had, except those participating in the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, was allocated to the invasion force assigned 
to the Philippines.  Although the Zero was designed as a carrier 
fighter, it had extremely long range and by late October 1941t^'eZetfo 
had been raised from a combat radius of 420 miles to 500 miles and 
this had been done without modification to the plane's engine or 
equipment.  However, Formosa was 550 miles away from the Manila 
area, and thus the Zero operational radius was 50 miles short.  It 
was believed this extra 50 miles could be attained through pilot 
proficiency and discipline; thus, the Zeros could operate from For- 
mosa. 
The Japanese Air Staff decided that the opening offensive in 
the Philippines would be directed at the enemy air force.  Shimada 
observed that there were several reasons for that decision.  The 
first of these was the strength of the United States air arm in the 
Philippines which "... was a much greater menace to our amphibious 
convoys than his relatively weak surface strength ....  It was 
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further decided that in these attacks, the top-priority target at 
enemy bases would be heavy bombers . . . ." 
The Japanese estimated the strength of the United States 
forces in the Philippine Islands to be: 
Ground:  Approximately 20,000 regular U.S. Army troops. 
Naval:  Heavy cruiser Houston, seaplane tender Langly, 
two flight cruisers, 15 destroyers, 15 sub- 
marines 
Air:  110 fighters, 40 bombers, 20 scout planes, 10 
light seaplanes, and 35 flying boats, for 
a total of 215 planes. 
The composition of Japanese forces employed against the Philippines 
was: 
Ground:  Fourteenth Army, comprising two-and- 
a-half infantry divisions supporting 
and service troops. 
Naval:  (a)  For direct participation in am- 
phibious operations:  Five heavy 
cruisers, five light cruisers, 
29 destroyers, two seaplane 
tenders, and a large number of 
small craft of various types, 
with light carrier Ryujo to be 
incorporated as circumstances 
might require. 
(b) To operate in nearby waters as 
a covering force:  Two battle- 
ships , two heavy cruisers, and 
nine destroyers under direct 
command of the theater naval 
commander. 
Air:  (a)  Army:  5th Air Group comprising 
72 fighters, 27 twin-engined 
bombers, 54 light bombers, 27 
reconnaissance planes, and 12 
liaison planes; a total of 192 
planes, 
(b) Navy: Eleventh Air Fleet main 
strength, comprising the 21st 
and 23rd Air Flotillas with 108 
Zero fighters, 13 old-type 
fighters, 81 new-type bombers, 
36 old-type bombers, 15 recon- 
naissance planes, 24 flying 
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boats, and 27 transport 
planes; for a total of 304 
TO 
planes.xo 
Therefore, in December 1941, the Japanese held air superi- 
ority        in the Far East, principally due to two reasons. 
First, the radius of the Japanese Zeros had been increased to some 
550 miles.  Second, the United States air build-up in the Philip- 
pines was three months away from completion. 
The Japanese estimates of U.S. strength were very accurate. 
General Marshall, in The War Reports, stated that, 
The left wing of the southward advance 
of the Japanese was concentrated on the 
reduction of the Philippines.  Our 
strength in the islands at that time 
consisted of 19,000 United States Army 
troops, 12,000 Philippine scouts, and 
approximately 100,000 men of the newly 
mobilized but partially trained and 
equipped Philippine Army.  Included in 
these forces were some 8,000 Army Air 
Force personnel equipped with some 250 
aircraft, of which 35 were Flying For- 
tresses and 107 were P-40 fighters. 
Some nine hours following the initial bombing of Oahu, the 
Japanese initiated a major attack on Clark Field.   When General 
Brereton was informed of the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor he, 
"... requested permission to carry out action immediately after 
daylight.  General Southerland agreed with my [Brereton1s] plans 
and said to go ahead with preparations; in the meantime he would 
obtain General MacArthur's authority for the daylight attacks." 
Brereton left MacArthur's Headquarters to prepare the B-17*s for 
offensive action and to wait for orders to take action.  These 
orders, for reasons still unknown, were never issued. 
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At about 8 A.M. Maj. David Gibbs, operations officer of the 
19th Bombardment Group "... ordered all B-17's into the air when 
he received information that Japanese planes were approaching." 
With only one of these airborne B-17's loaded with bombs, General 
Brereton finally received permission to execute offensive bombing 
missions. The Flying Fortresses were radioed back to Clark Field 
to be refueled and loaded with bombs. As that task was being com- 
pleted "... an estimated 54 Japanese bombers, flying in two waves, 
attacked Clark Field from high altitude .... The attack . . . 
17 
came without warning." 
Initial reports estimated loses at ". . .17 B-17's destroyed 
or damaged and 16 out of 21 P-40's of the 20th Pursuit Squadron de- 
stroyed ....  The first incomplete casualty report gave 186 
18 killed, 214 missing, and 42 wounded at all fields." 
On December 11, telephone communications between the Philip- 
pine Islands and the United States were restored, and General Bre- 
reton received a long-distance call from General Arnold in Washing- 
ton.  Brereton, in his memoirs, recorded Arnold's opening remarks, 
"'How in the hell could an experienced airman like you get caught 
with your planes on the ground?  . . . That's what we sent you 
there for, to avoid just what happened.1  I [Brereton] tried to ex- 
plain what had happened, but halfway through the conversation the 
Japs came over strafing the field.  'What in the hell is going on 
there?'  General Arnold shouted.  'We are having visitors,'  I 
[Brereton] replied." 
General Brereton requested that General Arnold delay making 
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his judgement until he received a complete report. Brereton re- 
ported the incident to General MacArthur who ordered Brereton "... 
19 to go back and fight the war and not to worry."   Despite their 
initial setbacks, the Army Air Force Far East fought on.  Brereton 
20 
wrote that the accomplishments of his men were incredible.   Arnold 
must have agreed with General Brereton, in spite of their December 11 
conversation.  Two days after Brereton and Arnold talked a radiogram 
from Arnold was received in the Philippines.  "For Brereton.  The 
eyes of the entire world friend and enemy are focused in admiration 
upon the officers and men of the American Air Forces in the Philip- 
pines.  The fighting spirit being displayed by you has brought Amer- 
ica to its feet as one man.  Your heroic success against such ex- 
treme odds and discouragement has set the pace that will carry this 
nation forward to victory.  We continue to depend upon you.  Keep 
your heads high and your chins up.  Your country will not fail 
„21 
you." 
However, with the destruction of so many B-17's any plans 
for offense against Japan ended. The three major advocates of the 
B-17 build-up in the Philippine Islands, Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson, Chief of Staff George Marshall and Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Air Henry Arnold all had felt the need for military power behind 
our diplomatic posture in the Far East.  In turn President Roose- 
velt, after some vacillating, backed this reinforcement of the Far 
East. 
The basic question, which must be answered, is.could the 
build-up if completed, have been efficacious in stopping Japanese 
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expansion without war? Since so few heavy bombers were actually 
placed in the Philippines, no one will ever know if the War Depart- 
ment' s daring gamble would have been successful.  Japan's attack on 
Pearl Harbor eliminated the belief that, once these bombers were 
placed in the Far East, the U.S. would have the upper hand with 
Japan.  If the Japanese willingly attacked one of the world's 
strongest navies, she would not have been deterred by the strength 
of the U.S. Army Air Force.  Indeed, General Brereton believed that 
Japan would not have sat idle while the U.S. established a powerful 
air force in the Philippines.  Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 
ended any need for speculation.  Dr. Pogue, Marshall's biographer, 
assessed the situation accurately, "In whatever hopes he [General 
Marshall] held for the Far East Air Forces in November, 1941, he 
was deceived.  The new B-17, much improved as it was, still could 
22 
not perform the ma]or miracles that he expected of it." 
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Appendix I 
Chronological Report of Trans-Pacific Flight, September 19, 1941.* 
Friday, September 5. 
Departed Hickam Field 5:55, Honolulu time.  Weather good, 
except for two hours of instrument flying thru a trough of rain and 
heavy clouds.  Cruised at 8,000 en route. 
Landed Midway  13:05 
Total Time  7 Hours 10 Minutes 
Distance  1,132 Nautical Miles 
Estimated T. 0. Weight  51,400 Pounds 
Pan-American radio bearings from Midway very satisfactory. 
Contacted Midway control tower voice on landing instructions. 
Landed on the 4,500 foot runway, which was adequate even with no 
wind. 
Estimated landing weight 45,500 pounds.  Refueled from two pits and 
drums. 
The engine driven gas pumps which we brought along proved to be 
lifesavers. 
On any future hop, be sure to include them as items of equipment. 
Had no help in manning the hand pumps as the local marine detach- 
ment was out on manuevers.  Could have gased entirely at the pits 
but wanted to give the men experience in handling gas from drums 
in order to facilitate operations at Wake where there are no pits. 
Midway is a beautiful airdrom, complete even to tie down rings 
buried in cement. 
^Located at MacArthur Memorial Archives, Box 1, RG2. 
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The officers ate and slept at the Construction Mess and 
B.O.Q., which are located on another island.  The facilities were 
very good, and shortly will be excellent.  Much construction is 
still in progress. 
The men slept on cots under the wings of their own ships 
and ate at the marine mess which was none too good as most of the 
marines were out in the field.  We furnished five men per meal to 
help in the kitchen. 
It is difficult to figure the gas consumption accurately 
because we siphoned water out of drums and in addition there was 
some wastage due to poor connections, etc.  All ships were com- 
pletely serviced and staked down for the night 3 1/2 hours after we 
landed.  The Navy strainers were very helpful, but those made by 
Colonel Lewis would have been adequate. 
Saturday, September 6. 
Arose 3:00 A.M.  (Wake Time, Breakfast 3:30 A.M.  Take-off 
4:45 A.M.  All nine ships off O.K..  My ship hit two birds in taking 
off.  Fortunately, they hit the fuselage.  Being large birds, the 
result might have been serious had they hit a prop. Weather excel- 
lent.  Scattered cumulus clouds with bottoms at 2,000 feet and tops 
at 5,000.  Cruised at 8,000. 
Crossed International Date Line at 7:45 A.M., and in one 
second it became 7:45: 
Sunday, September 7. 
Radio bearings from Wake were quite accurate. Homing was 
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possible within the last forty miles.  In homing on 333 kilocycles, 
great care must be taken to have the radio compass very finely 
tuned.  If it is not carefully tuned, the needle will give an indi- 
cation for a right or left turn which pulls you completely through 
a 360 degree turn without ever going to the other side. 
Landed Wake  11:20 A.M. 
Total Time  6 Hours 40 Minutes 
Distance  1,035 Nautical Miles 
Time for Refueling  4 Hours 
The gasoline drums had been placed in the parking area so 
that each ship taxied to its own supply.  We refueled all ships with 
out motor driven pumps. 
Mr. Teaters who is in charge of construction at Wake had 
everything well in hand. His planning for our service, food and 
shelter left nothing to be desired.  The meals were excellent, beds 
fine, and he had ample transportation on hand for use of both men 
and officers.  Some of us were guests at his home for a barbeque 
steak dinner which we finished at 8:00 P.M..  We rested for three 
hours and then rose at 11:00 P.M.. After some hot coffee and a 
short operations meeting we went out to the field and took off at 
midnite for Port Moresby, New Guinea. 
Monday, September 8. 
Mr. Teaters had lined the runway with gasoline flares 
which were very helpful as some of the runway edges which looked 
alright, were actually not. We had a fine moon and the weather 
looked perfect.  The take-off was good. Captain Fisher had to re- 
turn and land shortly after the take-off because a stud in his cuno 
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broke and threw oil all over the ship. He was loaded up to maximum 
gross weight, and did a very fine job of getting back onto the 
field. They fixed it on the ground, topped off his tanks, and sent 
him on his way, about one hour and a half behind the rest of the 
flight. The first two hours we flew at 8,000 feet and then climbed 
to 20,000 (indicated). As we approached the mandated Japanese Is- 
lands, all lights were turned out. We shortly approached some heavy 
clouds. We climbed to 26,000 feet (indicated) without being able to 
top them, so we decided to penetrate.  They were the type of cloud 
which is usually associated with equatorial warm fronts; plenty of 
rain, but not much turbulence.  In roughly 2 1/2 hours we emerged, 
and a celestial fix showed us to be about 100 miles north of Ponape. 
We skirted the eastern shore of the island at 22,000 feet (indica- 
ted), but could see nothing, save a group of lights near the north- 
east tip of the island. The dawn started breaking 50 minutes after 
passing Ponape, and we let down to 13,000 feet for breakfast.  Com- 
plete radio silence was the rule for this leg of the trip and it 
was not broken until we opened up the position report sequence again 
when well past the Mandates.  We had lost visual contact with the 
other ships of the formation, but the position reports when re- 
sumed, showed everyone to be in nice relative position. Lt. Teats 
lost both autosyns during the night, and consequently had no engine 
instruments.  In addition, his No. 1 engine stopped after 7 1/2 
hours of flight due to lack of fuel. He estimated losing 175 gal- 
lons of gas out of that tank in some unknown manner. He was cer- 
tain of being fully serviced before departing Wake, so we could 
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think of no explanation except that  it might have been caused by 
siphoning at take-off.     At  any rate, they were  concerned about their 
gas,   and were thinking of going into Rabul.     A message  from  Moresby 
however,  stated that  Rabul was  soft,  and recommended not  landing 
there exceptinCg] a real emergency.     Decided to stretch it  into 
Moresby,  and arrived O.K. 
Landed Moresby    12:55  P.M. 
Total Flying Time  12 Hours 40 minutes 
Distance  2,176 Nautical Miles. 
We could not get a check on our gas consumption at Moresby 
because there wasn't enough 100 Octane fuel to service us. We re- 
fueled with a mixture of 100 and 90 octane fuel, with a resultant 
mixture of approximately 97 octane. 
Captain Hubbard met us with open arms. Had a detail of 
R.A.A.F. enlisted men and many bushy headed natives to do the re- 
fueling.  He supervised it while we went to town to wash up and rest. 
The ships were left under the very capable guard of the Papauan In- 
fantry Battalion. We stayed with the R.A.A.F. and ate at their mess. 
We were very sincerely welcomed and enjoyed our stay tremendously. 
The facilities at Moresby were primative [sic] to say the least.  No 
sanitation, running watern [sic] and all canned food except for a 
little native fruit.  Called on the Territory Administrator, Mr. Mur- 
ray, who told us that they had been greatly anticipating our arrival 
because it was to be the first time that a United States Army Unit 
ever set foot on Australian soil, and that our arrival had, conse- 
quently, some historical significance. 
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Tuesday, September 9. 
Rested, and took in some of the local scenery, native vil- 
lages, etc., and met Commodore Lukis who was sent up to greet us 
from Townsville, Australia, by the Air Board in Melbourne. 
Wednesday, September 10. 
Took off 8:45 A.M. for Darwin.  Weather excellent.  Hazy. 
Cruised at 7,000 feet.  En route, looked over Horn Island Airport 
which seems to be an excellent one. 
Landed at Darwin  3:15 P.M. 
Total Flying Time  6 Hours 30 Minutes 
Distance  934 Nautical Miles. 
Darwin is an excellent field in the dry season.  Huge run- 
ways in all directions.  The dust is very bad however.  It is con- 
templated surfacing the runway in the near future so as to eliminate 
the dust.  (The favorite excuse for another drink here is, "Let's 
have one to lay the dust.") Was greeted upon landing by the Admini- 
strator, Nothern [sic] Territory, Mr. Abbott.  He presented greet- 
ings from the Governor General, and the Prime Minister.  Group Cap- 
tain Charles Eaton had me stay at his home.  The rest of the squad- 
ron were very comfortably fixed in quarters on the field.  A gala 
party was given in our honor that evening, at which we were all 
stripped of our collor [sic] and shoulder insignia by the members 
of the R.A.A.F. for souvenirs.  The gasing at Darwin was very well 
arranged by Major Muehlenburg. They used gas trucks and had plenty 
of 100 octane fuel available.  Received a telegram of welcome from 
the senior member of the Air Board in Melbourne, Sir Charles 
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Pickett, which I answered. The Non-Commissioned Officers Mess took 
excellent care of our enlisted men. 
Thursday, September 11. 
Maintenance day. We found that in several ships some of 
the crew failed to turn of[f] oxygen supply at their own stations 
when finished using it.  This, of course, drained the entire supply 
while on the ground. We used oxygen for 10 hours on the flight from 
Wake to Moresby, starting with 350 pounds pressure and ending with 
approximately 150. Had this leak not occurred, we would have had 
sufficient oxygen for several additional hours flying. 
Paid calls on the Civil Administrator and Army and Navy 
Commanders. Held operations meeting in the early forenoon at shich 
[sic] Major Muehlenburg gave us what proved to be some very valuable 
information as to the location of Clark Field and the terrain sur- 
rounding it. 
Firday [sic], September 12. 
Took off at 4:25 for Manila. Cruised at 9,000 feet.  Laid 
course so as to stay west of the Philippines, in order to be able to 
let down over the water if necessary, and be clear of all mountains. 
Visibility taking off at night was poor due to dust stirred up by 
taxing. Weather excellent.  Crossed Dutch East Indies at Ambon. 
Near the northern portion of Zamboanga, the sky became overcast. 
Cloudiness increased as we continued northward.  Contacted Clark 
Field by liason [sic] set and requested weather report.  Received 
ceiling 1,200 feet, light rain, visibility one mile, and passing 
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rain.  A still later report gave us ceiling 4,000 feet, visibility 
7 miles.  It looked as though they were having intermittant squalls. 
When approaching the southern tip of Panay, we received a message 
from Clark Field advising landing, if practicable, at Del Monte be- 
cause of unsettled weather conditions at Manila.  I knew nothing of 
Del Monte and before leaving Hickam Field had been advised by radio 
from the Philippines that "Clark Field was the only, repeat, only 
field suitable for landing B-17 in the Philippine Islands.["]  This, 
plus the fact that the weather did not look too bad at Manila made 
me decide it was not practicable to go to Del Monte, and to continue 
on to Clark.  The only suitable alternate airdromes for this leg 
were back in the Dutch East Indies at Amborn and Boeroe, a distance 
of some 900 miles. 
We began to hit squally conditions between Panay and Min- 
doro.  Changed altitude to sea level, where we flew through some 
heavy squalls off the Mindoro Coast. We were able to maintain con- 
tact with the coastline however; most of the time by flying from 
100 to 400 feet.  The ships were spread out in storm echelon, and 
the hourly position reports showed them to be in good relative posi- 
tion. 
The weather became increasingly worse as we approached 
Manila, but we had a nice break in finding a dome of good visibility 
inside Manila Bay near Corregidor. We circled in that area, depart- 
ing at 3 minute intervals for Clark Field, 60 miles to the north 
where the sky was very black.  Difficulty was experienced in locating 
the field because of the heavy rain and the low ceiling.  The runway 
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was very hard to pick up because there was no clear line of demarca- 
tion between sod and surface.  The greatest difficulty was experi- 
enced in the actual landing itself.  Pilots were completely blind to 
the front because of the heavy rain on the windshield.  The Engineer 
standing behind the pilot could see out of the dome and was of great 
assistance in guiding the pilot into the landing. A manual wind- 
shield wiper would have been a most valuable asset in this condition. 
All pilots made three or four passes before getting down, but finally 
made it allright [sic] with the exception of one mishap. The rudder 
of one B-17 was damaged in hitting the wing tip of a parked B-18 
which the pilot could not see.  It is considered feasable [sic] to 
repair this damage locally however. 
Upon landing we found we had been traveling through the 
periphery of a typhoon which continued to deluge Clark Field for the 
next three days. 
Landed Clark Field  4:00 P.M. 
Total Flying Time  11 Hours 40 Minutes. 
Distance  2,000 Nautical Miles. 
(Straight Distance....1,800 miles.[)] 
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COMMENTS 
1. In some ways the secrecy with which this flight was con- 
ducted was a definite handicap. This was particularly true in the 
receiving of weather information. No one knew when to expect us or 
from what direction.  For instance, no information on weather in the 
Philippine Islands was available to us at Darwin.  In the future 
when a flight is dispatched from Honolulu, I recommend, that effec- 
tive that moment, complete weather information from the Philippine 
Islands be sent daily to Darwin until the flight arrives in Manila, 
then, regardless of time of arrival at Darwin, the flight will have 
a complete recent picture of the weather to the north.  If there is 
a typhoon in the vicinity of Manila this fact should be known and 
the flight should remain on the ground at Darwin until it has defi- 
nitely cleared. 
2. Very careful study must be given to the meager weather 
information available on the route Wake-Moresby. We were very for- 
tunate in getting a good night. The front thru which we passed was 
just building up. We found that it stirred up into severe storm the 
very next day. The violence of equatorial storms must not be under- 
estimated.  The clouds will build up to 40,000 feet.  If there is 
any doubt as [sic] all about the weather en route, I recommend that 
the ships be tied down at Wake to await definitely good weather. 
This leg should be planned for a moonlight night. 
3. The folders compiled by Colonel Raley have been mailed 
for return to Hickam.  It made an excellent reference text but 
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should be thinned out so as to contain only essential information. 
We kept adding things to it before leaving Hickam until it was too 
bulky to use handily.  I think it should contain only pictures, de- 
scriptions and locations of airdromes which might be used.  In addi- 
tion to the detailed information on each suitable field, a master 
chart of the entire route, in small scale, might be prepared showing 
the approximate location of each airdrome with reference to its near- 
est outstanding landmark. 
We had no information on the Philippine Islands what 
ever [sic], except that Clark Field was its only suitable airdrome. 
I found since arrival, however, that a very complete booklet has been 
prepared by the Air Force here and sent out by Clipper mail in plenty 
of time to reach us before our departure from Hickam.  It was placed, 
unfortunately, on the Clipper which cracked up on the reefs of Guam 
and consequently never reached us.  It has undoubtedly, arrived now 
and will be available to the next flight. 
4. A study should be made into the cause for the siphoning 
of gasoline through the overflow drain. This is a serious situation 
and should be corrected.  Care must be taken in flight not to fill 
the tanks to overflowing when transferring from one to another. The 
schedule set up in our operations order proved very satisfactory for 
the cruising conditions for which it was set up.  It must, of course, 
be revised for any other cruising condition. We topped off our gas 
tanks at Wake after the engine warm up. This may have been respon- 
sible for Lt. Teats' loss of gas thru shiphoning on take off. 
5. We followed the power settings set up in our operations 
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order fairly closely [sic] but found that due to our excessive weight 
we had to use a little more manifold pressure than was prescribed. 
A good general rule is to set the RPM's and manifold pressure so as 
to keep an indicated air speed at level flight of 150 MPH for the 
first half of the gas load and at 145 MPH for the second half. 
6. The following items are necessary for a trip of this kind 
and should be carried in the ships. 
1. Motor driven gasoline pumps. 
(One per three ships is adequate), [sic] 
2. Gasoline strainers made of 200 mesh screen. 
3. Lengths of thinwalled rubber tubing for si- 
phoning of water out of bottom of gas drums. 
7. I wish to express my appreciation for the fine work of 
Majors Huehlenburg and Moore and Captains Blake, Hubbard and Flick- 
enger, all of whom I understood are soon to return to Honolulu. 
Without their efforts this flight would have had a much less chance 
of successful completion.  They worked hard and unselfishly and de- 
serve the highest commendation. 
8. I wish to express my appreciation to all the officers at 
Hickam who helped to ease our path.  We left in rather a hurry but 
we certainly had all the help that was humanly possible. 
E. O'DONNELL 
Major 
Air Corps 
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Appendix II 
WAR DEPARTMENT 
Washington, October 21, 1941.* 
Strictly personal and Confidential. 
My dear Mr. President: 
I have received your letter of October 14th in which you 
raise the question of the "proper strategic distribution" of our new 
four-engine bombers.  In order to answer as carefully as possible 
the questions you raise, I have consulted the Chief of Staff, the 
head of the Air Forces and the head of the War Plans Division of the 
General Staff.  I have also been assisted in forming my views by the 
conferences which I recently had with these gentlemen and their sub- 
ordinates in which we have gone over these same problems of strategy 
for the purpose of answering your inquiry of last July as to the 
means necessary to bring this war to a successful conclusion. All 
of these labors have had a direct bearing upon the problem raised in 
your present letter.  I hope that you will discuss this question 
fully with your military advisers before you make up your own mind 
upon this question. But pending such a conference I shall try to 
give you a brief epitome of my own views in answer to your letter of 
October 14th.  I do not think that they vary in any substantial par- 
ticular from those of the gentlemen with whom I have consulted. 
1.  Essentially, this question of the distribution of 
these planes is really not a static but a dynamic question.  It is 
^Located in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 20, pp. 4442-4444. 
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not to be solved by taking a map and computing how many planes shall 
be allocated to certain geographical positions.  These new four- 
engine bombers now coming off the assembly line should constitute a 
great pool of American power applicable with speed and mobility to 
the respective spots where in the interests of our national strategy 
of defense it is important that such power should be applied. 
These planes themselves are not individually a fin- 
ished element of such power.  They must be manned with crews, trained 
first in individual operation and then in group operation, before 
they become the vital elements of this pool of power.  The process 
of commissioning a plane is not unlike the process of commissioning 
a battleship, and you know how long that takes.  The melancholy list 
of casualties which have recently occurred to our planes in the 
hands of British pilots is a reminder of the danger of trying to 
shorten this time and to use such planes with hastily trained crews. 
Again, the panorama of the theatres of action for our 
defense is constantly and rapidly changing.  The relative importance 
of the different theatres of action varies greatly at different mo- 
ments. This precludes static allocations or conceptions. The num- 
ber of our planes at strategic points must be susceptible of rapid 
reenforcement and change.  The ability thus to throw great massed 
power upon a given place at a given time is one of the essential 
elements of an effective use of air power. Germany in her use of 
air power has shown thus far supreme skill in her ability to mass 
her air force at different places at different times. The fate of 
the war conceivably may hang upon the length of time within which 
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we can throw an overpowering force of these planes into a given 
theatre. 
The center of all of these operations is the United States. 
There the planes are manufactured.  There their combat crews are 
trained. There their group formations are organized and tactically 
instructed.  From that as a center it should be possible in times of 
opportunity or necessity to send these trained combat units out as 
reserves to such theatres of action as need them. At present you 
will remember from my letter of September 22nd that the minimum num- 
ber of ten groups of these planes, to which we have been reduced by 
the exigencies of the demands of outside nations, does not permit 
the retention of any such pool as I have described above within the 
continental United States. Nor does it provide the absolute essen- 
tial of enough equipment in the shape of four-engine bombers to 
train the large number of combat pilots and crews which will be 
needed to maintain our air forces in the various theatres of defense 
of the United States. This in itself shows the fundamental error of 
a static conception and the results which will follow from a merely 
geographic allotment of the planes. 
What is happening today in the Pacific exemplifies the 
importance of the foregoing principles. A strategic opportunity of 
the utmost importance has suddenly arisen in the southwestern Paci- 
fic. Our whole strategic possibilities of the past twenty years 
have been revolutionized by the events in the world in the past six 
months.  From being impotent to influence events in that area, we 
suddenly find ourselves vested with the possibility of great 
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effective power.  Indeed we hardly yet realize our opportunities in 
that respect. We are rushing planes and other preparations to the 
Philippines from a base in the United States which has not yet in 
existence the number of the planes necessary for our immediate mini- 
mum requirements in that southwestern Pacific theatre.  This is a 
result of our deferments to the British of last year.  From nowhere 
but the United States can come the needed planes, the crews, the 
equipment, and the training.  Yet even this imperfect threat, if not 
promptly called by the Japanese, bids fair to stop Japan's march to 
the south and secure the safety of Singapore, with all the revolu- 
tionary consequences of such action.  As you well know, however, the 
final success of the operation lies on the knees of the gods and we 
cannot tell what explosion may momentarily come from Japan.  If we 
had the reserve necessary in the United States, we should not be in 
this present period of uncertainty. 
Simultaneously with this southwestern Pacific opportu- 
nity, another such chance is opening in the northwestern Pacific. 
Vladivostok is one of three gateways to Russia. The Archangel gate 
may be closed at any moment. The Persian Gulf gate is insignificant 
in capacity. The propinquity of Alaska to Siberia and the Kamchatka 
Peninsula and the facilities which we believe (although we have not 
yet had opportunity for testing them) exist in that neighborhood, 
present us with the opportunity for another use of these bombers 
supplementary to the one I have just described in the south.  That 
locality can possibly form the base of a northern pincer movement of 
American influence and power, this time not only to protect against 
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aggression of Japan but to preserve the defensive power of Russia in 
Europe.  Its operation would fit into and supplement the operation 
from the south by permitting a circular sweep of these bombers which 
would greatly increase their safety by permitting those in the south, 
after passing over Japan and stopping at Vladivostok, to proceed to 
safety in the north in a way similar to the sweeps which Germany is 
now employing through the North Atlantic from Norway to France.  The 
power of such a completed north and south operation can hardy be 
over-estimated.  The control over the Western Pacific which it would 
open could hardly fail to have immense powers of warning to Japan as 
well as of assurance to Russia.  It might well remove Japan from the 
Axis powers. But it will require the existence of an adequate force 
of these bombers — even greater I believe than the minimum require- 
ments stated in my letter to you of September 22nd.  At present under 
the system of allocation we are planning but one group for Alaska. 
That I believe would be quite inadequate.  Any my feeling is strongly 
reenforced by information which I have just received from General 
DeWitt who is responsible for the Alaska station. Today there are 
not more than two four-engine bombers in the whole of Alaska. 
2. I have dwelt thus far on the Pacific front of our na- 
tional peril because that is the one in which the threatened danger 
from Japan and the counter opportunity for us to take the initiative 
has first ripened. Our northeastern front in the northern Atlantic 
is, however, the main theatre of the present war. There we are al- 
ready in actual naval combat with Germany. The four-engine bombers 
which we have proposed to place in Newfoundland are not designed to 
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repose idly in the hangars of that outpost during the present emer- 
gency. They are to form the reserve compotent of a team of such 
four-engine bombers of which the advance unit is to be in Iceland, 
only seven hours away by air.  This takes on an added importance 
with the approach of the coming winter during which time the long 
range flying boats of the Navy now engaged in the North Atlantic 
and based on Iceland may be restricted by ice conditions in the har- 
bors where they ordinarily land.  In other words, we contemplate the 
possibility of sweeping operations by these long range bombing planes 
and have planned to place them in these separated bases to facilitate 
that purpose as well as to protect against air attack on either base. 
Our past deferments to Great Britain of the B-24 bombers have con- 
tributed to the delay in the establishment of these two bases.  Six 
of these four-engine bombers have just been sent to Newfoundland. 
None is yet at Iceland. 
The daily increasing peril of the northeastern Atlantic 
is evidenced only too clearly by the recent incident of the Kearny. 
As you know from our talk the other day when General Embick was pre- 
sent, I am much concerned that steps should be taken as promptly as 
possible to secure the defense of our principal bastion in the north- 
east, namely the British Islands. That safety will not be secured by 
a comparatively insignificant trickle of planes, unequipped, unman- 
ned, and unorganized for battle formation.  The situation requires 
far more radical treatment than that.  It requires treatment which 
will make safe beyond peradventure a favorable decision of the battle 
of the Atlantic as well as the defense against invasion of the 
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British Isles.  I have already stated my views to you on that sub- 
ject and I shall not repeat them here, except to say that I think 
the time is coming rapidly when these radical steps should be taken. 
Otherwise I fear lest some morning we be caught napping by a sur- 
prise German attack.  All that is germane for me to say in respect to 
my present letter is that I believe, in the light of this situation 
and of Britain's safety alone, that it is better for her to have in 
the world a potent, well-armed, friendly American air force than a 
few additional planes. 
Quite apart from that, there remains the question of 
the possible impairment of the defensive power of our own country 
which it is always our first duty to secure. Giving full tribute to 
the enormous service which has been rendered and will continue to be 
rendered to our own defense by our furnishing weapons to hard-pressed 
nations already fighting in a cause common to us all, I believe that 
the moment has now come when we should give our primary attention to 
the prompt development of a well-armed, well-rounded, and well- 
trained American air force.  And I have, after using the most careful 
consideration and study, reached the conclusion that it would be un- 
wise to divert further production from the Army air forces until 
such time as the minimum requirements stated in my letter of Septem- 
ber 22nd are fully completed. 
Faithfully yours, 
Henry L. Stimson 
Secretary of War. 
The President, 
The White House. 
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Appendix III 
Letter MacArthur to Marshall 
October 28, 19H1* 
My dear Marshall: 
This is written in pursuance of the plan, initiated by my 
letter of August 30th, of writing to you from time to time to give 
you a general outline of developments in the Philippines. 
The response of the Philippines Army has been excellent. 
Ten regiments of infantry, one from each of ten reserve divisions, 
together with cadres of officers and non-commissioned officer of the 
remaining elements, were mobilized on September first and commenced 
an intensive training program.  Morale has been exceptionally high 
and all ranks show a real eagerness to learn.  In consequence train- 
ing has progressed even beyond expectations.  Most of the soldiers, 
being from rural districts, are in excellent physical condition; 
they are, of course, completely acclimated, and the sick rate is 
very low—consistently better than that of American troops.  Disci- 
pline is almost perfect. 
A construction program was initiated without delay and is 
making excellent progress. Photographs are enclosed, showing the 
type of construction and the materials employed.  Costs are low, 
fifty dollars per man for Filipinos and one hundred and seventy- 
five dollars per man for Americans. The buildings can be erected 
quickly and are entirely adequate for this climate. Sites secured 
*This letter is located at the MacArthur Memorial Archives, Box 1, 
RG2. 
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—either public lands or through lease—provide adequate training fa- 
cilities. Housing is provided where practicable in general areas, 
perhaps 20 to 30 kilometers in extent, rather than in concentrated 
divisional camps, with a view to the conservation of training time 
for subordinate units. The areas selected are shown on the enclosed 
map. With the completion of the first shelter, divisional Engineer 
Battalions were mobilized, and all ten of them are now working in 
their own divisional areas. Nine regiments of infantry are being 
moved into the camps this month, and on November second nine addi- 
tional regimlnts will be mobilized on their cadres, which have been 
in training since September first.  All elements of the ten divisions 
and in addition three regiments of Constabulary, will be mobilized 
and housed in their new camps by December 15th. The selection of 
sites, the acquisition of land, the preparation of building plans and 
the execution of the construction program within this short space of 
time represents an outstanding achievement on the part of Colonel 
Richard J. Marshall. He has shown clear vision, superior organiza- 
tional and planning ability and outstanding qualities of forceful 
leadership. 
From a planning standpoint, the major part of the organiza- 
tional work for a theatre of operations had been completed.  I en- 
o 
close a chart which shows the organization as projected. The Phil- 
ippine Army, in its present stage of development, has produced in- 
fantry divisions, some coast artillery and a considerable number of 
air corps pilots. Corps and Army elements that would provide a 
balanced force were scheduled for production only in the latter part 
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of the Commonwealth's Defense Plan and those units must n'ow be 
formed, utilizing reservists who have had basic infantry training. 
Organizational equipment for them had not yet been provided and 
must be supplied in toto from the United States.  In certain units, 
particularly anti-aircraft artillery, Philippine Army officers are 
not yet available, and the officer personnel will have to be Ameri- 
can. 
The first squadron of B-17s completed a very satisfactory 
flight from Hawaii.  Detailed information has been sent back for 
use by future flights.  Airplane crews were in fine condition with 
high morale and expressed pleasure regarding their new station. 
Upon direction by the War Department, arrangements were rapidly made 
here to ship gasoline and oil to staging points for use by the later 
flights. 
Good progress is being made in the development of air 
fields. The location of fields thus far selected for construction 
or development is shown on the enclosed map. We are prepared to 
take care of the contemplated additional units as rapidly as these 
can be sent out. 
Let me amplify the meagre information I have supplied on 
the U.S. Philippine Division, the reorganization of which you have 
already approved. The strength of the Philippine Scouts is fixed, 
as you know, at 12,000. They are assigned to the Philippine Divi- 
sion, the 91st and 92nd Coast Artillery, the 26th Cavalry, and vari- 
ous service elements and detachments. It would be impolitic to in- 
crease the number even if possible, for all recruits would be taken 
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from Philippine Army reservists to serve at higher rates of pay than 
the Philippine Army can pay. The Philippine Division should be or- 
ganized at war strength and be trained intensively for offensive com- 
bat as an element of the General Reserve. After study, it was found 
that the only way to meet the requirements with the numbers avail- 
able was to secure an additional American regiment of infantry, with 
two battalions of artillery to complete American combat teams with 
the 31st Infantry and the new regiment.  Certain small units were 
also deemed desirable. The division can now be organized as a tri- 
angular division at war strength, retaining all old line Scout units, 
although the 45th Infantry will be rendered inactive except for the 
garrisons of Petit Barracks and Camp John Hay.  There will be suf- 
ficient Scouts to bring the 91st and 92nd Coast Artillery up to an 
adequate strength, retain several small units now in existence, and 
provide station complements for McKinley and Stotsenburg, thus mak- 
ing the division completely available for combat training and for 
instant use.  The division will be regrouped for station by combat 
teams.  This will add materially to the combat efficiency of this 
command.  The entire plan will be placed in effect upon the arrival 
of the new regiment. I anticipate its dispatch, although I have 
not yet been advised to that effect.  I enclose a chart of the or- 
ganization—although a complete report will be made to the Adjutant 
General when the plan is effectuated. 
I have recently received War Department Operations Plan, 
Rainbow 5, and have written to the Adjutant General with reference 
to it.  It was prepared in conformity with the action of the Joint 
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Board, approved by the Secretary of War on June 2, and thus ante- 
dated the creation of this command.  It was based upon the old con- 
cept of the defense of the entrance of Manila Bay.  The new situa- 
tion since, of course, necessitates its revision.  The new plan 
should contemplate the defense of the Archipelago and the Philippine 
Costal [sic] Frontier should be delimited accordingly.  The wide 
scope of possible enemy operations, particularly with air elements, 
makes imperative the broadening of the concept for there can be no 
effective defense of Luzon without denying to the enemy the air 
fields in the southern islands.  The development of the Philippine 
Army provides a force sufficient to accomplish such a mission. 
Although there is a political campaign in progress that 
will culminate in the Presidential election next month, the local 
situation here is excellent. Quezon has made a remarkable recovery 
from his illness and his leadership and national control are com- 
plete; he will not have any serious opposition for reelection.  Mo- 
rale in the Commonwealth is high.  The local press and innumerable 
speeches by leaders throughout the country give evidence of poise; 
there is no hysteria.  This has been brought about to a large ex- 
tent by the organization of this Command.  Prior to that, there yas 
uneasiness and dread, noticeably accentuated by each minor crisis 
precipitated in the Western Pacific area. 
The naval component of the Philippine Army has reached a 
milestone in its development, having recently placed in service the 
first locally built torpedo boat, and having laid down ten new ones 
that are expected to be in the water by the end of March.  My 
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original plans in 1935 included a project for a fleet of fast motor 
torpedo boats. The protected waters of this archipelago provide an 
ideal theatre for effective operations. The U.S. Navy at that time 
could not be stirred to interest itself in the development, and I 
was forced to turn to British builders to get what I wanted. Two 
boats were delivered and found satisfactory; three more were built, 
but were diverted to Finland; five additional were finished, but 
the British Admiralty commandeered those.  I closed out the con- 
tract, securing delivery of ten sets of engines in return for the 
payments already made on boats, purchased the right to build from 
the British design and constructed a boat here.  It was successful 
and we are now gping into, comparatively speaking, quantity produc- 
tion.  Meanwhile the successful use of this type in the war led the 
Navy into belated experimental development, followed by a produc- 
tion schedule. At my suggestion, Admiral Hart asked the Navy De- 
partment to ^send some of their craft here, resulting in the alloca- 
tion of twelve, of which six have arrived. They naturally provide 
a welcome addition to defense potentialities, and should give an 
impetus to the development of the Philippine Army element. The 
naval component has not yet been called into U.S. service, but its 
development is continuing as originally planned.  I informed Hart 
that I would issue the order whenever he wanted the unit, but it 
will be called only in case of war.  I am satisfied. 
I wish to reiterate my appreciation of the splendid sup- 
port you and the War Department are giving me. No field commander 
could ask more. Your attitude has been a marked factor in the 
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building of morale here. 
Faithfully yours, 
Signed (Douglas MacArthur) 
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Appendix IV 
November 5, 1941.* 
Memorandum for the President: 
Subject: Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation. 
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have 
reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in 
the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador 
to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval At- 
tache.  These despatches [sic] have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai- 
Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and 
that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use 
of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat 
of this threat.  The Secretary of State has requested advice as to 
the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese of- 
fensive against Kunming and the Burma Road. 
There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive 
against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese 
Central Government.  The result might even be the collapse of fur- 
ther effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the 
liquidation by Japan of the "China incident".  If use of the Burma 
Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China 
will be seriously curtailed for some months.  If resistance by/the 
Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese trbops in 
China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, 
^Located Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division of 
the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
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after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal. 
Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated of- 
fensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less 
than about two months, although initial offensive operations might 
be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over 
nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communica- 
tions, will be extremely difficult.  The maintenance of supply lines 
will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would 
have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground 
troops alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and num- 
bers. 
The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the 
Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the 
United States is justified in undertaking offensive military opera- 
tions with U.S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing 
the Burma Road.  They consider that such operations, however well- 
disguised, would lead to war. 
At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific 
is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited 
strategic offensive in the Western Pacific.  In order to be able tc 
do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing 11 naval ves- 
sels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. 
An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous 
merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now 
considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic 
of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom 
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to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future. 
The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East 
are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and 
Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch 
East Indies.  The Philippines are now being reinforced.  The present 
combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the is- 
lands a hazardous undertaking.  By about the middle of December, 
19 41, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines 
will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south 
of Formosa.  The U.S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have 
reached its projected strength by February or March, 1942.  The po- 
tency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it 
might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in 
the areas south and west of the Philippines.  By this time, addi- 
tional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have 
arrived.  The general defensive strength of the entire southern area 
against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impres- 
sive proportions. 
Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be 
extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not re- 
sult in war with Japan. These measures are:  continuation of eco- 
nomic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of muni- 
tions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of 
aid to the American Volunteer Group. 
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are 
in accord in the following conclusions: 
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(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in 
the United States-British Staff Conversations remain 
sound.  The primary objective of the two nations is 
the defeat of Germany.  If Japan be defeated and Ger- 
many remain undefeated, decision will still have not 
been reached.  In any case, an unlimited offensive war 
should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a 
war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the 
Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy. 
(b) War between the United States and Japan should be 
avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far 
East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly 
threatens territories whose security to the United 
States is of very great importance.  Military action 
against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more 
of the following contingencies: 
(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed 
forces against the territory or man- 
dated territory of the United States, 
the British Commonwealth, or the 
Netherlands East Indies; 
(2) The movement of Japanese forces into 
Thailand to the west of 100° East or 
south of 10° North; or into Portu- 
guese Timor, New Caledonia, or the 
Loyalty Islands. 
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(c) If war with Japan can not [sic] be avoided, it should 
follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; 
i.e., military operations should be primarily defen- 
sive, with the object of holding territory, and weak- 
ening Japan's economic position. 
(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against 
Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, 
or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention 
by the United States against Japan. 
(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan 
should be extended to the Chinese Central Government. 
(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, 
complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, eco- 
nomic, and military fields, should be undertaken in 
common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, 
and the Netherlands East Indies. 
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff rec- 
ommended that the United States policy in the Far East be based on 
the above conclusions. 
Specifically, they recommend: 
That the dispatch of United States armed 
forces for intervention against Japan in China 
be disapproved. 
That material aid to China be acceler- 
ated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great 
Britain, and our own forces. 
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That aid to the American Volunteer Group 
be continued and accelerated to the maximum 
practicable extent. 
That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. 
Signed by C/S and CNO. 
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WAR DEPARTMENT 
War Department General Staff 
War Plans Division 
Washington 
November 6, 1941 
NOTE FOR RECORD: 
The attached W.P.D. study, subject, "Far Eastern Situation", 
was prepared in War Plans Division with the help of the Defense 
Aid Division, the staff of the Army Air Forces G-2 and G-4 on Nov- 
ember 2, 1941. The Chief of Staff informally approved the recom- 
mendations as the views of the War Department and used this paper 
as a basis of his presentation on the subject to the Secretary of 
State on November 4.  The study should now be filed in W.P.D. with 
this note attached. 
C. W. Bundy, 
Colonel, G.S.C. 
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